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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of June 11, 2007, the wheelchair carrying twelveyear-old Michelle Cedillo was pushed into the front of a courtroom of
1
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C. Michelle,
whose health began deteriorating seven days after receiving a
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccination and who currently suffers
2
from autism, wore hearing protection and hit herself repeatedly
3
before being wheeled out of the courtroom. A short time later,
opening statements began in the long-awaited case of Cedillo v.
4
Secretary of Health & Human Services.
5
The Cedillo case is the first autism test case to go to an evidentiary
hearing in the “Vaccine Court,” a tribunal of special masters situated
6
within the Court of Federal Claims. In brief, the test cases are the
1. Gardiner Harris, Opening Statements in Case on Autism and Vaccinations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2007, at A21.
2. Shankar Vedantam, Fight Over Vaccine-Autism Link Hits Court, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2007, at A6. In addition to autism, Michelle Cedillo suffers from seizures,
arthritis, gastro-intestinal issues, and is nearly blind. Id. Michelle’s mother recalled
that the “profound downward change in Michelle’s health began seven days
following the MMR [measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine].” Tony Mauro, Vaccine
Test Case Reaches Federal Court, LEGAL TIMES, June 4, 2007, at 10.
3. Harris, supra note 1.
4. No. 98-916V, 2007 WL 1577972 (Fed. Cl. May 10, 2007).
5. For a description of the Omnibus Autism Proceeding and the test case
framework, see infra Part I.E.
6. Cedillo is taking place under the auspices of the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Compensation Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006). Section 12 of the Act
established the Office of Special Masters within the Court of Federal Claims. Id.
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first part of a larger Omnibus Autism Proceeding (OAP) created by
the Vaccine Court in July, 2002, to determine whether the
administration of certain vaccines, and in particular vaccines
8
containing the mercury-based preservative thimerosal, cause or
9
contribute to autism. After almost five years of arguments pertaining
10
to jurisdiction, discovery, procedure, and expert testimony, the
panel of three special masters was finally ready to listen to the
evidence and decide whether the vaccinations in question caused or
11
significantly aggravated Michelle’s condition.

§ 300aa-12(c). Media accounts often refer to the Office of Special Masters as the
“Vaccine Court.” E.g., Mauro, supra note 2. This Comment uses the term “Vaccine
Court” to refer to the Office of Special Masters and the phrase “Vaccine Act” or “Act”
to refer to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act. For a fuller
description on the statutory structure of the Vaccine Act, see infra Part I.C.
7. See Autism General Order #1, In re Claims for Vaccine Injuries Resulting in
Autism Spectrum Disorder or a Similar Neurodevelopmental Disorder v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. July 3, 2002),
2002 WL 31696785, available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/autism/Autism+General+Order1.pdf (setting out the reasoning for conducting
the OAP). As part of the OAP framework, the Vaccine Court created an Autism
Docket, which contains a complete list of the various legal filings, updates, court
orders, and rulings. United States Court of Federal Claims, Docket of Omnibus
Autism Proceeding, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/node/2718 (last visited Oct. 1,
2008). All the filings on the Autism Docket have the same case caption, “In re Claims
for Vaccine Injuries Resulting in Autism Spectrum Disorder or a Similar
Neurodevelopmental Disorder” [hereinafter Omnibus Autism Proceeding]. For a fuller
discussion on the background of the vaccine-autism controversy and creation of the
OAP, see infra Part I.D–E.
8. Thimerosal is an organic compound that is approximately fifty percent
mercury by weight and has been used since the 1930s as a preservative in some
vaccines. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research, http://www.fda.gov/CBER/vaccine/thimerosal.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2008). Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations require that preservatives
be used in multidose vials of vaccines, except live viral vaccines, to prevent bacterial
and fungal contamination which can lead to serious illness and death in recipients.
See Leroy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-392V, 2002 WL 31730680, at *8
(Fed. Cl. Oct. 11, 2002) (summarizing the history and uses of thimerosal); see also
Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 293 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“In childhood
vaccines, thimerosal has been used to ‘deter microbial and fungal growth, thereby
maintaining safety, purity and potency of vaccines’ both during and after the
manufacturing process.”). Thimerosal has been largely removed from vaccines.
Infra note 105.
9. For a brief discussion on the scientific and medical literature surrounding
the vaccine-autism controversy, see infra Part I.D. Although it highlights some
scientific and medical articles, this Comment does not attempt to analyze the
relevant literature or reach a conclusion regarding the studies concerning the safety
of vaccines. Instead, this Comment is focused on exploring some of the legal
decisions made early in the course of the OAP and examining how those decisions
could become problematic for certain plaintiffs in the aftermath of decisions in
Cedillo and the rest of the test cases.
10. For a discussion and analysis of some of the legal challenges encountered
during the OAP, see infra Part II.
11. The Vaccine Act utilizes different standards of proof than traditional tort
litigation. Infra Part I.C.5
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12

The potential implications of the OAP are vast. At stake in the
outcome of the litigation is not only whether Cedillo’s claim and
approximately 4900 other pending autism claimants will receive
compensation and medical care, but also the future of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and perhaps
13
public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of vaccines.
Whatever the outcome in the test cases, some things are already
clear. For instance, while Cedillo and the autism litigation have
14
received a considerable share of attention, the test cases are unlikely
15
to be the end of the legal fight over vaccines and autism. In fact,
even after the completion of the Cedillo hearing, the OAP framework
still calls for additional hearings exploring the possible vaccine16
Moreover, because the test case hearings did not
autism link.
conclude until July 2008, a decision from the Vaccine Court

12. See Mauro, supra note 2 (highlighting some potential implications of the test
cases); see also Roy Richard Grinker, Op-Ed., Science on Trial, WALL ST. J., June 30,
2007, at A6 (“The anti-vaccine movement may be evidence that public confidence in
science is eroding, which means that public health is at risk too.”).
13. See Mauro, supra note 2 (noting the “dramatic public health consequences” of
the litigation); see also Gardiner Harris, Measles Cases Grow in Number, and Officials
Blame Parents’ Fears of Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at A16 (reporting on the
rising number of parents who refuse to vaccinate their children over fears that
vaccines cause autism).
14. There have been a lot of stories concerning the Cedillo case and autism in the
mainstream media. For instance, both Oprah Winfrey and Larry King devoted entire
episodes of their television programs to discussing autism. Larry King Live (CNN
television broadcast Feb. 28, 2008); Oprah Winfrey Show (ABC television broadcast
Sept. 17, 2007). Also, the legal drama Eli Stone premiered with an episode depicting
a trial where a jury awards a mother $5.2 million in damages after it is revealed the
CEO of a healthcare company kept his daughter from receiving a vaccine containing
mercury. Eli Stone: Pilot Episode (ABC television broadcast Jan. 31, 2008). On April 2,
2008, the United Nations marked the first World Autism Awareness Day. Press
Release, United Nations General Assembly, Secretary-General Hails Courage of
Children, Families Confronting Autism (Apr. 2, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26177&Cr=child&Cr1=health.
15. See Autism Update-January 19, 2007 at 5–8, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/autism/Autism%20Update%201%2019%2007.pdf (discussing the
plans for two additional test cases). Moreover, a decision in Cedillo is not expected
until sometime in the fall of 2008, and a decision on the merits in the thimerosal
only test case is not likely until 2009. See infra note 17 (noting that the hearings are
not supposed to conclude until September 2008 and that post-hearing motions will
likely delay a final decision until 2009); see also Grinker, supra note 12 (“We should
not expect too much out of this trial, or the next eight.”).
16. See Autism Update-March 14, 2007 at 4–6, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. Mar. 14, 2007) available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/autism/Autism%20Update%203%2014%2007.pdf (explaining that the
additional theories to be heard by the court are (1) whether thimerosal alone causes
autism and (2) whether the Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccine alone causes autism).
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regarding causation in the final test case is unlikely to be issued until
17
well into 2009.
In addition, the legal fight over vaccines and autism will go on long
after the OAP because the decisions reached by the special masters
18
are likely to be appealed. Indeed, the test case proceedings call
upon the special masters to consider thousands of pages of medical
documents, epidemiological studies, and expert scientific and
19
medical testimony. Thus, there will surely be several legal avenues
to challenge the special masters’ factual findings on matters such as
witness and expert credibility and legal conclusions with respect to
20
21
causation.
Under the terms of the Vaccine Act, the Court of
17. The hearings on the remaining general causation theories were originally
scheduled to conclude by September 30, 2008. Autism Update-January 17, 2008 at 2,
Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/update%201%2017%2008
.pdf. However, in September 2008, the Vaccine Court, acting on requests from the
government and petitioners, announced it was no longer necessary to hold hearings
in the third test case theory because that theory was not distinct at all from theories
one and two. Autism Update-September 29, 2008 at 3, Omnibus Autism Proceeding,
Autism
Master
File
(Fed.
Cl.
Sept.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/autism_update_9_29_08.p
df; see also infra note 127 (describing the three original test case theories). Taking
into account the time to submit post-hearing briefs and further time for the special
masters to evaluate the relevant evidence, it seems a decision regarding the second
theory would not be issued until 2009.
18. Indeed, the decision of one special master is not binding on any other special
master. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 40 Fed. Cl. 625, 630
(1998) (“Special Masters are neither bound by their own decisions nor by cases from
the Court of Federal Claims”); see also Notice Regarding Reassignment at 1, Omnibus
Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Jan. 11, 2007) available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/1%2011%2007.pdf (“For
the [Office of Special Masters] to finally resolve not only petitioners’ proposed test
cases, but also the remaining over 4700 cases, will require rulings from the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.”) (emphasis added).
19. See Autism Update–May 25, 2007 at 2, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. May 25, 2007), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/autism/Autism%20Update%20Untitled.pdf (noting that the
government provided petitioners approximately 218,000 pages of material during
discovery). In addition, the government made several federal agency officials
available for depositions. Ruling Concerning Petitioners’ “Second Motion to
Compel” at 4, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File, (Fed. Cl. May 25, 2007),
2007 WL 1983780, at *3 ,available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/autism/Ruling%20Untitled.pdf. Furthermore, at the Cedillo hearing, the
Vaccine Court heard testimony from eighteen different expert witnesses. List of
Expert Witnesses at 1–2, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. June
12, 2007) available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/
List%20of%20Expert%20Witnesses.pdf.
20. To make matters slightly more complicated, the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not apply in Vaccine Act cases. See Hines ex rel. Sevier v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 21 Cl. Ct. 634, 647 (1990) (“There is nothing in the Vaccine Rules or the
Vaccine Act to indicate that the Special Master is bound by formal evidentiary rules
that govern the consideration of evidence in federal trial courts.”); Order Denying
Motions for Exclusion of Expert Testimony at 2, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. May 29, 2007), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/
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Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
22
have jurisdiction over appeals of the decisions of the special masters.
In addition to the possible appeals within the Court of Federal
Claims, the Vaccine Act allows claimants to reject decisions reached
by the special masters and take their claims outside the Vaccine Court
23
Thus, if the special masters
and into state civil court systems.
ultimately find against the Cedillos, it seems possible some plaintiffs
might prefer to opt out of Vaccine Court and proceed to civil court,
where they would have the benefit of obtaining discovery documents
from vaccine manufacturers denied to them in the OAP and be
24
eligible for jury trials and greater damages awards.
Whatever the outcome in Cedillo and the remainder of the test
cases, it seems one loser in the autism litigation could be the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. As this Comment
documents, despite the best efforts of the special masters, deciding to
conduct the OAP may actually result in the procedural anomaly of
completely barring some families from filing vaccine-related lawsuits
25
in state or federal court. In fact, because of two decisions made
early in the course of the OAP—one holding that thimerosal claims
26
fall under the jurisdiction of the Vaccine Court, and the other
27
permitting the filing of special “short-form petitions” in the OAP —
default/files/autism/Order%20Denying%20Untitled.pdf (indicating the special
master has discretion to exclude scientific expert testimony after hearing it, not
before). For a discussion of the relevant standards and burden of proof in Vaccine
Act claims, see infra Part I.C.5.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e), (f) (providing for judicial review of special
master decisions in the Court of Federal Claims and Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit).
23. See id. § 300aa-21 (providing the various mechanisms for vaccine claimants to
leave Vaccine Court). For a fuller consideration of how the withdrawal provisions
may work in the specific context of the OAP, see infra Part III.
24. Indeed, Special Master Hastings largely denied plaintiffs’ discovery requests
from the vaccine manufacturers. See Ruling Concerning Petitioners’ “Second Motion
to Compel,” supra note 19, at 1, 2007 WL 1983780, at*1 (denying request by
petitioners to obtain discovery documents from vaccine manufacturers); Ruling
Concerning Motion for Discovery from Merck Re MMR Vaccine at 1, Omnibus Autism
Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2004), 2004 WL 1660351, at *1,
available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/Ruling%20
Concerning%20Motion%20For%20Discovery%20From%20Merck%20Re%20MMR
%20Vaccine.pdf (same).
25. Indeed, the Vaccine Act preempts other state and federal litigation unless a
plaintiff has first gone through the Vaccine Court. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)
(2006). Further, this same provision of the Act imposes specific requirements that
must be met before a plaintiff may file a lawsuit in state or federal court. Id.
26. Leroy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-392V, 2002 WL 31730680
(Fed. Cl. Oct. 11, 2002).
27. Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-819V, 2002
WL 31965743 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2002).

2008]

MERCURY RISING

465

there is at least one scenario where an unsuspecting plaintiff, after
waiting years in Vaccine Court, could elect to “opt out” of Vaccine
Court but end up being barred from bringing a lawsuit in state or
28
federal court because of unmet Vaccine Act requirements.
Furthermore, that same plaintiff may even be barred from returning
to Vaccine Court because of the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations
and the provision governing the filing of multiple petitions,
potentially leaving him without any cause of action for a vaccine29
related injury.
So far, the long-term impacts of permitting short-form petitions,
and the procedural anomaly that could result, have generally stayed
beneath the radar. Indeed, because the many lawyers, scientists, and
parents following the progress of the OAP are likely focused on the
medical, scientific, and technical issues involved in the test cases, it
seems easy to overlook the procedural dictates in section 11(a) of the
Vaccine Act, the provision that must be satisfied before commencing
a civil action in state or federal court against a vaccine manufacturer.
Moreover, because there has not yet been a decision reached in any
30
test case, and therefore no flood of claimants opting out of the OAP,
it does not appear that a state court or federal district court has
considered the effect of how a short-form petition might impact a
subsequent civil action.
This Comment sheds light on this dimension of the Vaccine Act by
examining some consequences that may flow in the aftermath of the
OAP. In short, this Comment argues that the Vaccine Court erred
with its decision to permit short-form petitions by overlooking that
procedure’s long-term implications on vaccine plaintiffs. In addition,
this Comment lays out a scenario to illustrate the potential pitfalls of
a hasty exit from the OAP and offers some guidance to plaintiffs to
28. See infra Part III.A–B (explaining that certain procedural requirements of the
Vaccine Act may bar a plaintiff from bringing a valid claim in state court). The
unmet requirements, as set forth in section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act, are that the
plaintiffs have never filed a proper “petition” and further that the petition was never
filed “in accordance with” section 16 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a).
29. See infra Part III.D (applying certain procedural requirements of the Vaccine
Act to a hypothetical situation to demonstrate how a plaintiff who filed a short-form
petition may ultimately be left without a forum to bring a Vaccine Act cause of
action).
30. This is not to say that no petitioners have ever left the OAP. To the contrary,
Special Master Hastings noted that some petitioners have left the OAP. E.g., Autism
Update-June 23, 2004 at 1 n.2, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed.
Cl. June 23, 2004), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
autism/6%2023%2004%20Autism%20Update.pdf (indicating that some cases have
been voluntarily dismissed or withdrawn by the petitioners). Still, the number of
petitioners leaving the program is relatively small and does not number in the
hundreds or thousands.
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avoid this outcome. The final part of this Comment offers some ideas
for improving the Vaccine Act to ensure that such an anomaly does
not occur in the future.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a general
discussion of vaccine use in the United States and describes the
historical circumstances that led to the creation of the Vaccine Act.
After highlighting the statutory framework of the Vaccine Act, Part I
describes the origins of the vaccine-autism controversy and the
creation of the OAP.
Part II analyzes three decisions made in the early stages of the
OAP. The first portion looks at the Vaccine Court’s assertion of
jurisdiction over thimerosal claims. The second portion considers
and criticizes the decision to allow short-form petitions to be filed.
The third portion looks at the special master’s attempt to stop the
potential flood of opt-out lawsuits in civil court by declining to issue
decisions.
Part III uses a hypothetical scenario to illustrate how the decisions
of the special masters, combined with statutory language of section
11(a) of the Vaccine Act, could work to bar some plaintiffs from filing
a vaccine lawsuit in civil court. In particular, this Part shows that a
plaintiff who leaves the OAP can expect a vaccine manufacturer to
challenge his civil claim on at least two specific grounds, namely that
a short-form petition is not technically a petition under section 11(c)
of the Vaccine Act and further that the short-form petition was not
filed in accordance with section 16 of the Vaccine Act. This Part
further demonstrates why due process and equal protection
challenges to the Vaccine Act are unlikely to be successful. Finally,
this Part shows that if a plaintiff is sent back to the Vaccine Court,
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and the provisions of the
Vaccine Act may even bar the claim there as well.
Part IV proposes some recommendations for improving the
Vaccine Act that draw on lessons learned from the OAP. Specifically,
Part IV proposes amending section 12 of the Vaccine Act to include a
“no omnibus” provision and amending section 11 to prohibit short
form petitions. Lastly, this Part proposes amending the Vaccine Act
to increase the number of special masters.
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BACKGROUND

A. A Short History of Vaccines: Past, Present, and Future
31

Vaccines are one of the triumphs of modern medicine. Diseases
such as smallpox, polio, diphtheria, tuberculosis, pertussis, measles,
mumps, and rubella that severely disabled people and claimed many
lives during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been
eliminated or dramatically reduced because of the development of
32
At present, death rates from diseases preventable with
vaccines.
33
vaccinations are at all-time lows in the United States.
Congress has long recognized the importance of vaccines and
passed some of the first vaccine-related legislation at the beginning of
34
the nineteenth century. The Supreme Court also recognized the
importance of vaccines, holding in 1905 that states have authority
35
under their police powers to require mandatory vaccinations.

31. See generally Matthew Herper & Robert Langreth, Fear Factor, FORBES,
Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/sciencesandmedicine/2007/09/26/vaccinesthimerosal-autism-biz-sci-cx_mh_rl_0927vaccines.html (“[E]very year the shots
administered to children prevent 14 million infections, prevent 33,000 deaths and
save society $40 billion in direct and indirect medical costs.”); The Vaccine
Education
Center
at
The
Children’s
Hospital
of
Philadelphia,
http://www.chop.edu/consumer/jsp/division/generic.jsp?id=75697 (last visited Oct.
4, 2008) (listing some of the successes of vaccines).
32. Herper & Langreth, supra note 31. For a fuller discussion regarding the
history and benefits of vaccinations, see Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations:
Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 353, 362–82 (2004).
33. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Sharp Drop Seen in Deaths From Ills Fought by Vaccine, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A18. Statistics confirm that the incidence of certain diseases
is way down. For example, at present there are about 150 cases of measles reported
annually in the United States, compared to 763,094 cases of measles reported in 1958
alone. Press Release, Centers for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report, Measles, (May 1, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm57e501a1.htm. But see Harris, supra note 13 (noting the relationship
between the rising number of measles infections in the first seven months of 2008
and the growing number of parents who refuse to vaccinate their children).
34. PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 876–77 (3d ed. 2007). The federal legislation,
passed in 1813, was aimed to encourage vaccination and combat impure vaccines by
giving the President authority to appoint a Vaccine Agent to “preserve the genuine
vaccine matter.” Id. at 876 (quoting 2 Stat. 806 (1813)). Congress later repealed the
legislation, though, on the idea that it was “better to commit the subject altogether to
the local authorities.” Id. at 877 (quoting 3 Stat. 677 (1822)).
35. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) (recognizing the
power to require vaccinations is an appropriate exercise of the state’s police powers);
see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (citing Jacobson for the proposition
that it is “settled that it is within the police power of a state to provide for compulsory
vaccination”); see also Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century: Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1821 (2008) (observing the reasoning and logic in Jacobson
“pervade vaccine law decisions to this day”).

468

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:459

Today all fifty states as well as the District of Columbia mandate
36
childhood immunizations.
In terms of vaccine production, the vaccine industry is presently
37
experiencing a “renaissance.” Development is ongoing for several
38
brand new vaccines such as malaria and avian flu, and Wall Street
estimates profits from the global vaccine business will grow by
eighteen percent a year and reach thirty billion dollars annually by
39
2011.
B. Sore Spots: Side Effects, Lawsuits, and Falling National Stockpiles
Despite the many successes of vaccines, they are not without
controversy. After administration of a vaccine some recipients
40
inevitably suffer mild to severe side effects. Further, because the
government recommends children receive eleven different vaccines,
with some such as the Hepatitis B vaccine requiring three separate
41
doses, there is a greater chance of experiencing an adverse
42
reaction. Though only a small percentage of recipients experience
36. See Calandrillo, supra note 32, at 383 (noting that every state requires a
person to present evidence of receiving a vaccination for diphtheria, measles,
rubella, and polio prior to entering public school). However, in order to balance
public health and safety with individual rights and liberties, state legislatures have
been increasing the amount of allowable exemptions to vaccine laws. Id.; see also
James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical,
Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 863 tbl.1 (2001) (surveying court
decisions concerning vaccination law and policy).
37. See Robert Langreth, Booster Shot, FORBES, Nov. 12, 2007, at 78 (declaring “[a]
new golden age of vaccines is at hand”). Currently, development is under way for
vaccines to fight against illnesses such as malaria, meningitis, and avian flu. Id.; see
also Kendra Marr, Novavax Moves Closer to Licensing Bird Flu Vaccine, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 2008, at D4 (reporting on the efforts of large national biotech companies to
develop a bird flu vaccine).
38. See Langreth, supra note 37 (citing government support and public-private
partnerships as factors enabling the development of vaccines for pandemic
influenzas and diseases concentrated in poor countries).
39. Id.
40. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Safety and Adverse
Events, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/safety/default.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2008) (providing links to information about vaccine side effects such as fainting after
vaccination and other medical concerns about which parents should be aware).
41. According to the 2008 guidelines, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) recommends that children receive doses of eleven different
vaccines by the age of six. These vaccines are the Hepatitis B, Rotavirus, DipthreriaTetanus-Pertussis, Haemophilus influenza type b, Pneumococcal, Polio, Influenza,
Measles-Mumps-Rubella, Varicella, Hepatitis A, and Meningococcal. Centers for
Disease Control, Recommended Immunization Schedules for Persons Aged 0–18
Years,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5701a8.htm?s_cid=
mm5701a8_e (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
42. Randall B. Keiser, Déjà Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 15–16 (1992). The nature of
the side effects varies from redness and swelling at the injection site, to more
systemic reactions such as convulsions, very high fevers, or even death. Id. at 16.
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a side effect, the risk of a reaction is nearly impossible to avoid, and
44
the severity of the reaction is nearly impossible to predict.
As awareness of vaccine side effects entered the public
45
consciousness, many families of injured vaccine recipients sought
46
legal relief through the civil tort system. In fact, between 1980 and
1986 individuals brought damages claims of over three billion dollars
47
against vaccine manufacturers.
Although some claims were
successful, many claims went uncompensated due to the difficult
48
nature of vaccine litigation in the civil tort system.

43. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6345 (“There is today no ‘perfect’ or reaction-free childhood vaccine on the
market.”); Elizabeth A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 313–14 (1999) (listing various types of adverse
reactions to immunizations). For example, although the Centers for Disease Control
lists long-term seizures and permanent brain damage as severe reactions associated
with the DTaP vaccine, the agency notes that these are so rare it is hard to tell
whether they are even caused by the vaccine. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Information on Vaccine Adverse Reactions, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4; see also Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH.
L. REV. 149, 150 (1988) (noting the very small percentage of vaccine recipients who
suffer a side effect).
45. There were several items that helped raise public awareness regarding the
risks of immunizations. In 1982, the television documentary “DTP Vaccine Roulette”
received an Emmy nomination for its depiction of those who suffered neurological
injuries following DTP vaccinations. Breen, supra note 43, at 315. In addition,
mandatory swine flu vaccinations in the 1970s stirred fears of developing Guillian
Barre Syndrome. Kathy Koch, Vaccine Controversies: Are Today’s Vaccines Safe Enough?,
10 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 641, 645 (2000). Further, the depiction of side effects
linked to vaccines continues in modern times. E.g., Eli Stone: Pilot Episode (ABC
television broadcast Jan. 31, 2008) (suggesting a relationship between vaccines and
autism); see also The Simpsons: The Computer Wore Menace Shoes (FOX television
broadcast Dec. 3, 2000) (presenting an episode where Homer is taken to a
mysterious island after reporting that the flu vaccine is actually a form of mind
control meant to stimulate commerce during the holiday shopping season).
46. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1974)
(affirming a $200,000 jury verdict against manufacturer of oral polio vaccine);
Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986) (reversing a jury verdict of
ten million dollars in damages against a vaccine manufacturer, including eight
million dollars of punitive damages, awarded to a family in a vaccine injury case).
Injured vaccine recipients sought relief under a variety of legal theories including
negligent manufacture or administration of vaccines, inadequate warnings from the
manufacturer, and failure to provide alternatives. See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine
Insurance: Lessons From the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 60 (1999) (citing cases).
47. See Ridgway, supra note 46, at 61 (“[T]he potential for liability appeared to be
unlimited.”); see also Katherine E. Strong, Note, Proving Causation Under the Vaccine
Injury Act: A New Approach for a New Day, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 426, 434 (2007)
(noting the unpredictability of lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers and concern
of limitless liability for vaccine manufacturers and administrators).
48. See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product
Safety: Lessons From the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1859–60 (1995)
(explaining that vaccine litigation is difficult in the civil court system because of the
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The increase in vaccine litigation threatened to reduce the vaccine
supply in the United States by crippling the vaccine manufacturing
49
industry. Indeed, as legal costs and the inability to obtain product
liability insurance made producing vaccines unprofitable, vaccine
manufacturers left the market and national vaccine supply began to
50
fall to low levels. Thus, in 1986, in response to the shortage of
available vaccines, the potential decline in the number of immunized
children, and the pleas of the uncompensated victims of vaccine
injuries, Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
51
Compensation Act.
C. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act
As stated by Congress, the twofold purpose of the Vaccine Act was
to offer fair compensation to persons injured by vaccinations and to
ensure the continued supply of vaccines by shielding vaccine
52
manufacturers from civil liability. The Act has two parts. The first
part of the legislation establishes the National Vaccine Program
whereby federal officials coordinate vaccine safety and research to
ensure the overall effectiveness of the nationwide immunization

inability to raise design defect claims, the difficulty in establishing proximate cause,
and the length of time it takes to litigate claims).
49. See Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589–93 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
the mandatory swine flu vaccinations and noting that the “four manufacturers of the
[swine flu vaccine] found their insurers unwilling to accept the risk of claims by
persons alleging injury from the vaccination, and the manufacturers would not
proceed without insurance protection”).
50. See Neraas, supra note 44, at 151–52 (noting that many pharmaceutical
companies withdrew from the vaccine business between the 1960s and 1980s due to
concerns over liability). Indeed, during a portion of the vaccine supply crisis in the
1980s there was only one manufacturer of the oral polio vaccine, one manufacturer
of the MMR vaccine, and two manufacturers of the DTP vaccine. Id. at 151 n.16.
During this same time six vaccine manufacturers ceased production of vaccines, and
the stockpiles of vaccines fell below levels recommended by the CDC. Cantor, supra
note 48, at 1858–59.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006). For a fuller discussion of the vaccine
supply crisis and the creation of the Vaccine Act, see Ridgway, supra note 46, at 60–
62.
52. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6346 (declaring that the Act will establish a system for vaccine injury compensation
that is fair, simple, and easy to administer and will lead to more stability in the
childhood vaccine market); see also Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2–3
(1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the Act creates a remedial system that tries to deliver
compensation to victims more quickly while also reducing insurance and litigation
costs for manufacturers); McGowan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 31 Fed. Cl.
734, 738 (1994) (emphasizing that two central reasons for creating the Vaccine Act
were liability protection for vaccine manufacturers and easier compensation for
injured children).
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53

program. The second part creates the National Childhood Vaccine
54
Injury Compensation Program. This part spells out the terms by
which a person who has suffered a vaccine-related injury may seek
55
and obtain compensation.
In order to fully appreciate the specific context of the OAP, the
extent to which its framework differs from the structure of the
Vaccine Act, and the impact it may have on future civil litigation
outside the confines of the Vaccine Court, it is first necessary to
understand the legal regime set out by the Vaccine Act for
adjudicating claims. The discussion below provides a Vaccine Act
primer and describes the jurisdictional components of the Act, the
process for filing a claim, the petition for compensation and
discovery, the timeframe for adjudicating claims, the standards for
determining compensation under the Act, the scope of damages
56
available, and the right to appeal a Vaccine Act decision.
1.

Jurisdiction and preemption of state law
There are a few threshold requirements that Vaccine Act
petitioners must meet before being eligible to proceed in Vaccine
Court. For instance, a petitioner must be prepared to show that he
57
“received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table” and also
that he received the vaccine “in the United States or in its trust
58
territories.” In addition, with respect to the nature of the injury, the
petitioner (or his representative) must demonstrate that either he
“suffered the residual effects or complications” from the injury for
more than six months, “died from the administration of the vaccine,”
59
or his injury resulted in “hospitalization and surgical intervention.”
Further, the Act includes a statute of limitations provision that states
that claims brought under the Vaccine Act must be filed within thirtysix months of “the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or

53. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1. For a discussion about this aspect of the Vaccine Act, see
Phillip K. Russell, Development of Vaccines to Meet Public Health Needs: Incentives and
Obstacles, 7 RISK 239, 250 (1996).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -34.
55. See infra Part I.C (detailing the parameters of the Vaccine Act).
56. For another overview of the legal regime set out by the Vaccine Act,
including a more comprehensive discussion regarding attorneys’ fees, amendments
to the Vaccine Injury Table, and the congressional goals behind the legislation, see
Strong, supra note 47, at 436–44.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(A); infra Part I.C.4.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(B)(I).
59. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i).
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manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such
60
injury.”
In addition, the Vaccine Act prohibits state law claims against
61
vaccine manufacturers for “vaccine-related” injuries unless a
62
petitioner has exhausted his remedies under the Vaccine Act. If a
petitioner proceeds to civil court, the Act provides additional
protections for vaccine manufacturers named as defendants by
63
making several modifications to state tort law.
2.

Filing a claim
If a person believes he has suffered a vaccine-related injury, that
person or his legal representative may bring a Vaccine Act claim by
filing a petition in the United States Court of Federal Claims and
64
serving a copy upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
60. Id. § 300aa-16(a)(2). However, if the claim is alleging death from the
administration of the vaccine, the estate must file the action within twenty-four
months of death, and within forty-eight months of the onset of the original
symptoms leading to death. Id. § 300aa-16(a)(3). Filing an untimely petition can be
fatal to a vaccine claim because equitable tolling is not available to Vaccine Act
petitioners who file petitions beyond the statutory deadline. See Brice v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We determine . . .
that equitable tolling is inconsistent with the existing statutory scheme.”).
61. “Vaccine-related” is defined as an “illness, injury, condition, or death
associated with one or more of the vaccines set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table.”
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-33(5).
62. See id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (“No person may bring a civil action for damages
in an amount greater than $1,000 . . . against a vaccine administrator or a
manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine-related
injury . . . unless a petition has been filed, in accordance with section 300aa-16 of this
title . . .” and the United States Court of Federal Claims has issued a judgment under
section 12 and the petitioner rejects the judgment under section 21(a)); see also id.
§ 300aa-21(b) (providing that a petitioner may withdraw from the Vaccine Program
if the Vaccine Court moves too slowly). If a vaccinee misinterprets or ignores the
jurisdiction of the Vaccine Program and files a civil action in federal or state court,
under section 11(a)(2)(B) of the Vaccine Act, that court must dismiss the claim until
the vaccinee exhausts his or her remedies under the Vaccine Program. See id.
§ 300aa-11(a)(2)(B) (instructing the receiving court to dismiss the petition); see also
Laughter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 406, 411 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“If a
petitioner has not exhausted his or her remedies in this fashion, then pursuant to
[section eleven] he or she is not allowed to bring a civil action related to the claimed
vaccine-related injuries in state or federal court.”). For more discussion on the
relationship between the OAP program, and the requirements of section 11(a) of
the Vaccine Act, and future state civil claims, see infra Part III.
63. For instance, section 22(b)(1) of the Act forbids the award of compensation
for injuries that flow from “unavoidable [] side effects” of vaccines, section 22(c)
frees the manufacturer from liability for not providing direct warnings to an injured
person, and section 22(b)(2) imposes a presumption that the manufacturer
complied with FDA requirements regarding proper directions and warnings.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22; see also Shafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994)
(summarizing the Vaccine Act’s impacts on state tort law); Cantor, supra note 48, at
1863–64 (considering the Vaccine Act’s ban on direct failure to warn claims).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1). Under the terms of the Vaccine Act, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services is to “undertake reasonable efforts to
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Only one petition may be filed with respect to administration of each
65
vaccine. After filing, the petition is directed to the Chief Special
Master who may either keep the petition for himself or assign it to
66
another special master. The special master assigned to the claim
67
will determine whether compensation is appropriate. The Secretary
of Health and Human Services, who is the respondent in Vaccine Act
cases, is represented in Vaccine Court by attorneys from the United
68
States Department of Justice.
3.

The required “supporting documentation”
As discussed above, a Vaccine Act claim is initiated by filing a
69
The
petition for compensation in the Court of Federal Claims.
petition for compensation must be accompanied by specific
documents and the requirements governing petitions are more
70
elaborate than the pleading requirements utilized in federal court.
For example, according to section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act, a petition
for compensation “shall contain . . . an affidavit, and supporting
71
documentation.” Section 11(c) further specifies that the supporting
documentation “shall” include:
maternal prenatal and delivery records, newborn
hospital records (including all physicians’ and nurses’
notes and test results), vaccination records associated
with the vaccine allegedly causing the injury, pre- and
post-injury physician or clinic records . . . (including
all provider notes, test results, and medication
records), if applicable, a death certificate, and if
72
applicable, autopsy results . . . .

inform the public of the availability of the Program.” Id. § 300aa-10(c). For a
discussion regarding why the contents of the petition are so important, and the
potential consequence of not adhering to the requirements of section 11(c) of the
Act, see infra Part III.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(2).
66. See id. § 300aa-11(a)(1) (instructing the clerk of the court to forward the
petition to the chief special master).
67. See id. § 300aa-12(d)(3) (indicating that the special master’s decision must
include findings of fact and conclusions of law).
68. Id. § 300aa-12(b)(1).
69. Id. § 300aa-11(a)(1).
70. For instance, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading for relief
need only make a short and plain statement of jurisdiction, a short and plain
statement of the claim, and a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1).
72. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(2). The Act also allows the petition for compensation to
include “other available relevant medical records relating to the person who suffered
such injury.” Id. § 300aa-11(d).
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If any records are unavailable, the Act instructs the petitioner to
provide “an identification of any records of the type described . . .
which are unavailable to the petitioner and the reasons for their
73
unavailability.”
In addition, if additional records are needed, the Vaccine Act
allows for some discovery. Specifically, section 12(d)(3) gives the
special master authority to “require the testimony of any person and
the production of any documents as may be reasonable and
74
The Act specifically states that “[t]here may be no
necessary.”
discovery in a proceeding on a petition other than the discovery
75
required by the special master.”
Special masters, however, are
hesitant to order far-reaching discovery consisting of documents
76
other than medical records.
4.

The time-frame for adjudicating Vaccine Act claims
The Vaccine Act sets forth a schedule that envisions a streamlined
period for adjudicating claims. For example, under section 12(g),
the special master assigned to the petition is required to render a
decision “as expeditiously as practicable but not later than 240 days”
77
from the date the petition was filed. If the 240 day period is not
met, the Act provides that the special master may suspend
proceedings, but the total aggregate period for suspension cannot
78
exceed 180 days. The Act therefore envisions a maximum timeframe of 420 days to adjudicate a claim. However, a petitioner may
79
elect to remain in Vaccine Court beyond the 420 day time period.
5.

Proving causation: Table vs. off-table claims
The Vaccine Act sets out two separate avenues for a petitioner to be
compensated. First, a petitioner can bring a claim under the Vaccine

73. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(3).
74. Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(iii).
75. Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B).
76. See Ruling Concerning Motion for Discovery From Merck Re MMR Vaccine,
supra note 24, at 6–10, 2004 WL 1660351, at *7–9 (discussing the scope of discovery
in Vaccine Act proceedings and noting there is “extremely little case law relating to
discovery questions during the 15-year history of the Vaccine Act”).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii).
78. Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(C). If the special master has not made a decision by the
end of the 240 day period, the Act allows petitioners to choose whether to remain in
the Program or withdraw the petition. Id. §§ 300aa-12(g), 21(b).
79. In the event no decision is made in the 420 day period, section 12(g) of the
Act instructs the special master to “notify the petitioner under such petition that the
petitioner may withdraw the petition under section 300aa-21(b) of the title or the
petitioner may choose under section 300aa-21(b) of this title to have the petition
remain before the special master.” Id. § 300aa-12(g).
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80

Injury Table, which lists the vaccines covered by the Vaccine Act, the
injuries associated with each vaccine, and the time requirements by
81
which the first symptoms or manifestations of the injuries must arise.
Under this theory, if the petitioner establishes that he received a
covered vaccine, sustained one of the injuries listed in the Vaccine
Injury Table, and the first manifestation of the injury occurred within
the time-frame provided in the Table, he is entitled to a rebuttable
82
presumption that the vaccine caused the injury.
If the claim does not fall under the Vaccine Table, a petitioner may
try his claim via the second compensation avenue by bringing an “off83
table” claim. Under this theory, also referred to as a causation-in80. See id. § 300aa-14(a) (providing the original Vaccine Injury Table); 42 C.F.R
§ 100.3(a) (2007) (providing the current Vaccine Injury Table after revisions
through notice and comment rulemaking). An online version of the Vaccine Injury
Table is available at http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/table.htm. The
statute gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to amend the
Table through administrative rulemaking as additional scientific evidence becomes
available. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c); see also Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
195 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding the Secretary’s authority to modify the
injuries and symptoms included in the Table does not violate the Presentment
Clause of the Constitution). The Vaccine Injury Table has been amended several
times since the creation of the program. For example, in April, 2007, the human
papillomavirus vaccine was added to the Table, though the Table has not yet listed
recognized adverse events or a recognized timetable for this vaccine. See National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Addition of Meningococcal and Human
Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccines to the Vaccine Injury Table, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,937
(Apr. 20, 2007) (“[T]he Secretary announces that meningococcal (conjugate and
polysaccharide) and human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines are covered vaccines
under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program . . . . This Notice serves
to include meningococcal and HPV vaccines as covered vaccines under Category XIV
(new vaccines) of the Vaccine Injury Table . . . .”).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a); 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2007). For instance, one
recognized side effect of the Rubella virus containing vaccine is chronic arthritis
which is said to manifest in 7–42 days. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a).
82. See Gruber v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 61 Fed. Cl. 674, 678 (2004)
(discussing the mechanics of proving causation using the Vaccine Injury Table). For
example, if a petitioner demonstrated he received the MMR vaccine and
experienced an encephalopathy within 5–15 days after administration of the vaccine,
he would be entitled to a presumption of causation because he meets the criteria set
forth in the Vaccine Injury Table for that vaccine. 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a); National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Vaccine Injury Table, http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/table.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). However, even if a
petitioner makes this showing, the government may rebut the presumption by
making an affirmative showing by the preponderance of the evidence that the injury
in question is due to factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine. See
Gruber, 61 Fed. Cl. at 678 (“[A] ‘factor unrelated’ does not include ‘any idiopathic,
unexplained, unknown, hypothetical, or undocumentable cause, factor, injury,
illness, or condition.”) (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B)
(“[T]hat there is not a preponderance of the evidence that the illness, disability,
injury, condition, or death described in the petition is due to factors unrelated to the
administration of the vaccine described in the petition.”).
83. See Andreu ex rel. Andreu v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 98817V, 2007 WL 2706157, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 29, 2007) (describing statutory basis for
the off-table causation in fact claims).
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fact claim, the petitioner may prevail if he proves by a preponderance
84
of the evidence that the vaccine actually caused his injury. There is
no presumption of causation under this theory and recovery via the
off-table avenue is more difficult to establish than the on-table
85
method.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
remarked that under the off-table theory the “heavy lifting must be
done by the petitioner” and added further that the lifting “is heavy
86
indeed.” Furthermore, the government assumes a more adversarial
87
Because autism is not
position when defending off-table claims.
listed as an injury on the Vaccine Injury Table, claims alleging autism
88
must proceed via the off-table theory.
6.

Compensation and Vaccine Act funding
Section 15 of the Vaccine Act spells out the compensation available
89
to a plaintiff. Under that provision, recovery for a vaccine injury
includes medical expenses, lost wages, costs of future medical care,

84. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1); see also Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
418 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declaring that petitioner met the statutory
burden of establishing causation by a preponderance of the evidence). According to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to prevail on a causationin-fact claim, a petitioner must show by a preponderance of evidence that the
vaccination caused their injury by establishing: (1) a medical theory causally
connecting the vaccination and the injury; (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect
showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and (3) a showing of a
proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury. Id. at 1278. One
special master describes the preponderance of the evidence standard as “fifty percent
and a feather.” E.g., Banks v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-738V, 2007 WL
2296047, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 20, 2007) (affording particular weight to medical
records in determining whether a preponderance of the evidence was met).
85. See Grant v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 1144, 1148
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The Act relaxes proof of causation for injuries satisfying the
Table . . . but does not relax proof of causation for causation in fact for non-Table
Injuries.”).
86. Hodges v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
87. See Stevens v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001
WL 387418, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001) (observing that each off-table case
“proceeds as a traditionally litigated case—that is, full blown litigation”); Matthews v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 18 Cl. Ct. 514, 534 (1989) (indicating the
government as taking a “fully adversarial” position in challenging the petitioner’s
claim); Strong, supra note 47, at 446–47 (commenting on the adversarial nature of
off-table claims and noting that a common criticism of the Vaccine Act voiced by
petitioners’ attorneys and special masters is that the government attorneys were
“over-litigating” off-table claims). But see Knudsen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 35 F.3d 543, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The Vaccine Act does not
contemplate full blown tort litigation in the Court of Federal Claims.”).
88. See Analla v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 70 Fed. Cl. 552, 556 (2006)
(noting petitioners who cannot show a table claim must bring claims under the offtable theory); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2007) (providing injuries currently
covered under the Vaccine Act).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2006).
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and a maximum of $250,000 in pain and suffering. The Vaccine Act
91
does not allow for punitive damages, and in cases involving death,
92
Compensation to
damages are specifically set at $250,000.
successful claimants is paid from the Vaccine Injury Compensation
Trust Fund, which is overseen by the Treasury Department and
funded by a seventy-five cent tax levied on each dose of vaccine
93
covered by the Act.
7.

Judgments and appeals
After a program decision has been made and judgment has been
entered, the petitioner has ninety days to file an election with the
94
Vaccine Court choosing to accept or reject the judgment.
If a
petitioner accepts, he will be barred from subsequently initiating a
civil lawsuit “against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer for the
vaccine-related injury or death for which the judgment was
95
Government data indicates very few Vaccine Act
entered.”
petitioners choose to reject a favorable Vaccine Act judgment and file
96
a civil action.
The Act also provides for the right to appeal within the Court of
Federal Claims. For instance, after a special master issues a decision,
90. Id. Unreimbursed medical expenses include past and future expenses for
rehabilitation, developmental evaluation, special education, vocational training and
placement, case management services, counseling, special equipment, related travel
expenses, and facilities determined to be reasonably necessary. Id. § 300aa15(a)(1)(B)(iii). According to government statistics, since fiscal year 1990 there
have been 954 awards paid out of the Vaccine Court amounting to over $809 million.
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.,
STATISTICS
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/statistics_report.htm.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(d)(1).
92. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2).
93. See 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2006) (establishing a Vaccine Injury Compensation
Trust Fund in the Treasury of the United States); id. § 4131 (imposing a tax of
seventy-five cents per dose of vaccine). As of January 2007, there was approximately
$2.5 billion in the trust fund. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/VIC_Trust_Fund.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2008) (describing how the trust fund operates).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a) (providing for the election or rejection of
judgments made by the Court of Federal Claims).
95. See id. (“If a person elects to receive compensation under a judgment of the
court . . . such person may not bring or maintain a civil action for damages against a
vaccine administrator or manufacturer for the vaccine-related injury or death for
which the judgment was entered.”).
96. Indeed, according to statistics maintained by the Department of Health and
Human Services for claimants who reject a judgment awarding compensation, zero
percent of Vaccine Program claimants elected to reject their judgment in 2004 and
2005 while only 1.5% elected to do so in 2003. DIVISION OF VACCINE INQUIRY
COMPENSATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2006), available at
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/strategic_plan.htm.
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either the petitioner or the government may move for review in the
97
United States Court of Federal Claims. Decisions from the Court of
Federal Claims may be appealed to the United States Court of
98
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
D. The Vaccine-Autism Controversy
99

The rise of the incidence of autism is one of the most serious
100
public health issues in recent years.
The prevalence of the
condition has increased markedly, with current statistics suggesting
that roughly one child out of every 150 has autism or an autistic-like
disorder, compared to earlier estimates placing the rate at four or five
101
The etiology of autism remains a
children out of every 10,000.
102
mystery and science has not yet been able to determine a cause.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e). As a reviewing body, the Court of Federal Claims
reviews findings of fact under the arbitrary and capricious standard; legal questions
under the not in accordance with law standard; and discretionary rulings under the
abuse of discretion standard. See Dixon v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
61 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2004) (discussing the standard of review utilized by the Court of
Federal Claims and Federal Circuit); see also Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 440 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[W]e apply the same standard of
review that the Court of Federal Claims applied to the special master’s decision.”).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f). The parties have sixty days from the judgment of the
Court of Federal Claims to file an appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Id.
99. Autism is one of a group of disorders known as autism spectrum disorders
(“ASDs”). ASDs are developmental disabilities that cause substantial impairments in
social interaction and communication and the presence of unusual behaviors and
interests.
See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Autism
Information Center, http://www.cdc.gov/autism (last visited Oct. 4, 2008)
(providing information about autism including material about symptoms, screening,
and treatment). For some statistics concerning the rise of autism, see infra note 101.
100. A report by the Harvard School of Public Health found that it costs society
about $3.2 million to care for an autistic person over her lifetime, and caring for all
people with autism costs about $35 billion. See Press Release, Harvard School of
Public Health, Autism Has High Costs to U.S. Society (Apr. 26, 2006),
available
at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/2006-releases/
press04252006.html (showing the cost was broken down into two components, direct
medical costs (such as physician services, therapies and medication) that amounted
to more than $29,000 per person per year and indirect costs (such as special
education and child care) that amounted to anywhere between $38,000 to $43,000
per person per year). In recent years, a number of organizations have been founded
with the purpose of raising awareness about autism and devoting resources towards
finding a cure. E.g., Autism Speaks, http://www.autismspeaks.org (last visited Oct. 4,
2008). The specific fear that vaccines are linked with autism has made some parents
hesitant to vaccinate their children, making them more vulnerable to the diseases
vaccines are designed to prevent. See Harris, supra note 13 (reporting that many antivaccine advocates “will take measles over autism”).
101. Compare Benedict Carey, Study Puts Rate of Autism at 1 in 150 U.S. Children,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at A12 (reporting on data from a 2007 CDC study
concluding 1 in 150 children will develop an ASD by the age of eight), with Centers
for Disease Control, Autism Information Center, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/
autism/faq_prevalence.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (“For decades, autism was
believed to occur in 4 to 5 per 10,000 children.”). It has also been suggested that a
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The belief that vaccines were linked to the increase in the
incidence of autism gained prominence due to several events over
the past ten years. First, a scientific study published in the United
Kingdom suggested there is a link between autism and MMR
103
vaccine. The study received a lot of attention in the United States,
appearing in television stories and drawing strong reactions from
104
members of Congress.
And second, shortly after the United
Kingdom study was published, the various federal public health
agencies recommended that the preservative thimerosal be phased
105
Other events, such as legislation on Capitol Hill,
out of vaccines.
news coverage in the mass media, and the publication of additional
106
scientific studies helped spur the vaccine-autism debate as well.

change in diagnostic criteria accounts for some of this increase. See Paul T. Shattuck
& Maureen Durkin, Op-Ed., A Spectrum of Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at A19
(comparing the criteria used to diagnose autism in 1943 with the current diagnostic
guidelines).
102. See Centers for Disease Control, Autism Information Center,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/overview.htm#causes (last visited Sept. 20,
2008) (“[W]e still don’t know a lot about the causes of [autistic spectrum
disorders].”). There are a number of suggestions as to what causes autism, with
everything from television to PCBs being suspected. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Autism
Cases Up; Cause is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at A1 (listing environmental
factors such as prescription drugs, PCB’s, and food additives that have been named
as potential causes of autism); Gregg Easterbrook, In Search of the Cause of Autism, How
About Television?, SLATE, Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2149002/
(speculating that increased television watching in the 1980s may be responsible for
the rise in autism).
103. See A.J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis,
and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 LANCET 637, 637 (1998)
(attributing gastrointestinal disease and developmental regression in a group of
previously normal children to environmental factors).
104. Philip J. Hilts, House Panel Asks for Study of a Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000,
at A20. Speaking on the possible link between autism and vaccines, Congressman
Dan Burton, then chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight
Committee, said that “[w]e owe it to our children and grandchildren to insure we’re
being diligent in looking for causes of autism. We can’t stick our heads in the sand
and ignore the possibility.” Id.; see also 60 Minutes: MMR Vaccine (CBS television
broadcast Nov. 12, 2000).
105. In 1999, the Federal Public Health Service Agencies, “the American Academy
of Pediatrics, and [the] vaccine manufacturers agreed that thimerosal should be
reduced or eliminated in vaccines as a precautionary measure.” Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Vaccine Safety, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/
concerns/thimerosal.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). With the exception of some
influenza vaccines, thimerosal was removed from vaccines by 2001, and is no longer
used as a preservative in the manufacturing process. Id.
106. For example, in 2003, members of Congress attached a last minute provision
to a Homeland Security bill designed to shield thimerosal manufacturers from
liability. Susan Warner, New Vaccine Clause Angers Parents of Autistic; Amendment Buried
in Homeland Security Law Restricts Right to Sue Makers of Drug Preservative, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 2002, at A3; see also Bartholomew C. Wacek, Taking Sides in the Vaccine/Autism
Legal Battle, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 305, 308–09 (2004) (providing references to
scientific studies supporting a causal relationship between childhood vaccines and
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While some of the evidence supporting a link has been criticized,
107
and the qualifications of some experts called into question, the
perception that vaccines are responsible in some way for causing
108
autism remains very much alive.
Indeed, during the 2008
Presidential campaign, both John McCain and Barack Obama made
109
And, in March 2008, it
statements suggesting there is a link.
became public that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
conceded that vaccines may have aggravated an underlying
mitochondrial disorder in a young girl, which ultimately led to a

autism); Herper & Langreth, supra note 31 (referencing instances of vaccine-autism
stories depicted in the mainstream media).
107. Recently, Andrew Wakefield, the primary author behind the 1998 study, was
charged with professional misconduct for his role in the study. See Karen McVeigh,
Doctor in MMR Row Defends Stance at Disciplinary Hearing, GUARDIAN (London), Mar.
28, 2008, at 12 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/mar/28/
health.children (“It is alleged Wakefield accepted £50,000 for research to support
parents’ attempts to fight for compensation.”). Furthermore, several years after it
was published, ten of the thirteen authors of the Wakefield study issued a retraction.
Glenn Frankel, Charismatic Doctor at Vortex of Vaccine Dispute, WASH. POST, July 11,
2004, at A1. Moreover, the expertise of Dr. Mark Geier, a geneticist and author of
some studies in support of a vaccine-autism link, has also been called into question.
See Redfoot v. B.F. Ascher & Co., No. 05-2045PJH, 2007 WL 1593239, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2007) (“Dr. Geier is not qualified as a pediatrician, a neurologist, a
toxicologist, or an epidemiologist.”); Doe v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 2d 465, 476 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (ruling Dr. Geier was not qualified to testify as an
expert witness); Schrum v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-210V,
2007 WL 1772056, at *4 (Fed. Cl. May 31, 2007) (noting that Dr. Geier’s “credentials
and methodology” have been questioned in many cases in which he gave expert
testimony).
108. Robert Kennedy Jr., in particular, has been vocal in voicing his belief that
there is a government cover-up regarding vaccines and autism. For example, in
2005, he referred to the studies indicating no link between vaccines and autism as
“junk science,” decried the existence of secret government meetings about the safety
of vaccines, and further added that “the same regulatory bureaucrats that greenlighted thimerosal originally are now trying to cover their tracks.” Morning Joe: A
Coverup For a Cause of Autism? (MSNBC television broadcast June 22, 2005), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8243264/; see also Robert Kennedy Jr., Deadly
Immunity, ROLLING STONE, June 20, 2005, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/story/7395411/deadly_immunity/ (arguing that there is a government
cover-up regarding vaccines and autism). There were other developments in 2005 as
well. For instance, Tim Russert devoted a portion of his television show to discussing
the issue of autism and vaccines, see Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Aug. 7,
2005), and author David Kirby published a book exploring the relationship between
vaccines and autism. See generally DAVID KIRBY, EVIDENCE OF HARM (2005).
109. Specifically, John McCain stated that there is “strong evidence” that autism
has to do “with a preservative in vaccines.” See Benedict Carey, Into the Fray Over the
Cause of Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A18; id. (observing that Mr. McCain’s
statement “marked his entry into one of the most politicized scientific issues in a
generation”). Also, at a rally the day before the Pennsylvania primary, Barack
Obama said “[w]e’ve seen just a skyrocketing autism rate. Some people are
suspicious that it’s connected to the vaccines. This person included.” David Kirby,
Obama Climbs On The Vaccine Research Bandwagon, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 22, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-kirby/obama-climbs-on-the-vacci_b_97969.
html.
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110

diagnosis of autism. The impact of this concession, however, is not
yet clear because the case was decided under a settlement agreement
and not in a Vaccine Court decision, and the government still
111
maintains that vaccines do not cause autism.
On the other side of the debate, there is plenty of scientific and
epidemiological evidence indicating there is no relationship between
112
vaccines and autism.
For example, an exhaustive report by the
Institute of Medicine published in 2004 recommended rejecting a
113
In addition,
causal relationship between vaccines and autism.
numerous other peer-reviewed scientific and epidemiological studies
114
have concluded there is no such link.
Moreover, some evidence
shows that even after 2001, when thimerosal was removed from most
115
vaccines, autism rates continued to rise.
Finally, scientists
110. See Gardiner Harris, Deal in an Autism Case Fuels Debate on Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2008, at A9 (noting the government conceded vaccines may have hurt the
child and has agreed to pay her family for her care); Alison Young, First AutismVaccine Link: How Hannah Made History, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 6, 2008, at A1
(noting the government concession was that vaccines aggravated a rare underlying
metabolic condition, that in turn resulted in a brain disorder with features of autism
spectrum disorder).
111. See Autism Update-March 27, 2008 at 5, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/autism/Autism%20Update%203%2027%2008.pdf (noting the
inaccurate media descriptions on the conceded case and emphasizing the Vaccine
Court has not issued any ruling, decision, or opinion on it); see also Young, supra note
110 (observing the language in the settlement agreement “does not establish a clearcut vaccine-autism link” and further that “government officials continue to maintain
that vaccines don’t cause autism”).
112. See, e.g., Eric Fombonne et al., Pervasive Developmental Disorders in Montreal,
Quebec, Canada. Prevalence and Links with Immunizations, 118 PEDIATRICS e139, e140
(2006) (finding that “thimerosal exposure was unrelated to the increasing trend in
the prevalence of pervasive development disorder”).
113. See generally IMMUNIZATION SAFETY REVIEW: VACCINES AND AUTISM 1 (2004)
(surveying published and unpublished scientific and epidemiological literature and
concluding that “the body of epidemiological evidence” favors rejection of both a
causal relationship between the MMR vaccine and autism and between thimerosalcontaining vaccines and autism).
114. E.g., Anders Hviid et al., Association Between Thimerosal- Containing Vaccine and
Autism, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1763, 1763 (2003) (finding the risk of autism did not
differ significantly between children vaccinated with thimerosal-containing vaccines
and children vaccinated with thimerosal-free vaccines); Kreesten Meldgaard Madsen
et al., A Population-Based Study of Measles, Mumps, and Rubella Vaccination and Autism,
347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1477, 1477 (2002) (studying children born in Denmark
between 1991 and 1998 and finding no association between the age at the time of
vaccination, the time since vaccination, the date of vaccination, and the development
of autism).
115. See Study Finds Vaccine Preservative is Not Linked to Risks of Autism, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2008, at A18 (reporting on a study by California public health officials finding
the autism rate in children rose continuously in the period from 1995 to 2007); see
also Posting of Sanjay Gupta to Paging Dr. Gupta Blog, http://www.cnn.com/
HEALTH/blogs/paging.dr.gupta/2008/01/investigating-roots-of-autism.html (Jan.
9, 2008, 10:53 EST) (“From 2004 to 2007, when exposure to thimerosal dropped
significantly for 3-to 5-year-olds, the autism rates continued to go up . . . .”).
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attempting to replicate the original design of the United Kingdom
study recently concluded there is strong evidence against a link
116
between autism and the MMR vaccine.
E. The Vaccine-Autism Controversy and the Vaccine Court
As the vaccine-autism debate gained traction in the public
discourse, the Vaccine Court saw a rise in claims alleging that
117
vaccines were responsible for autism.
In fact, in the six-month
period before the creation of the OAP over 300 cases were filed
118
In July 2002, the Vaccine Court
alleging a thimerosal-autism link.
issued General Order #1 and announced it was adopting a special
procedure—the OAP—to handle the rising number of autism claims
119
Special Master
that had been filed or were expected to be filed.
120
George Hastings was selected to oversee the process.
The framework of the OAP differs in some respects from the
statutory framework of the Vaccine Act described above. For
instance, instead of adjudicating autism claims on a case-by-case basis,
the OAP created a two-part procedure for conducting the inquiry
into the causation issue. According to the Vaccine Court, the first
part of the OAP would not evaluate the petition and supporting
documentation in individual cases but instead “inquire into the
general causation issues involved in these cases—i.e., whether the
vaccinations in question can cause autism and/or similar disorders,

116. Mady Hornig et al., Lack of Association Between Measles Virus Vaccine and Autism
with Enteropathy: A Case Control Study, 3 PLOS ONE e3140 (2008), available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0003140.
117. See Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 1, 2002 WL 31696785, at *1
(noting “the influx of Program claims and the potential for many more such
claims”). In addition, numerous civil lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers, alleging
that thimerosal causes autism, were being filed in courts across the United States. Id.
In general, the courts that received these cases dismissed them as a matter of law
saying that such claims belonged in the Vaccine Court which had initial jurisdiction
over the claims because injuries sustained from “thimerosal” were vaccine related
under section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act. E.g., Owens ex rel. Schafer v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (granting vaccine
manufacturer’s motion to dismiss and recommending the plaintiffs proceed to the
Vaccine Court).
118. Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 1, 2002 WL 31696785, at *1.
119. Id. The Chief Special Master added:
It is in the interests of all that the [Vaccine Court] aggressively, but fairly,
manage this docket to ensure a timely presentation and resolution of the
difficult medical and legal issues raised in these cases . . . . The court is
confident that this procedure, coupled with the cooperative efforts and
quality advocacy of counsel, will provide the necessary information for
resolving these cases, within a reasonable time frame.
Id.
120. Id. at *3.
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121

In the second part of the OAP,
and if so in what circumstances.”
the conclusions reached in the general causation inquiry will be
122
With respect to scheduling, the
applied to the individual cases.
Vaccine Court departed from the 240/420 day time-period set out in
section 12(g) of the Vaccine Act and instead laid out a two-year
123
timeline to conduct the OAP which envisioned a discovery period,
an evidentiary hearing, and decision on the general causation issue to
124
be handed down in the summer of 2004.
As it turned out, the OAP did not meet the schedule set out in
125
General Order #1.
Indeed, much time after the creation of the
OAP was devoted to sorting out procedural issues and conducting
126
discovery. Moreover, by the time the Cedillo hearing began in June
2007, the Vaccine Court had split the general causation inquiry into
127
three separate theories, and two additional special masters had
128
As of
been appointed to help with the general causation inquiry.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The original schedule called for a 410-day period to conduct discovery. Id. at
app. E.
124. Id. at *4. The court declared it expected that “the parties will act promptly
and vigorously to adhere to this schedule, if not move more quickly.” Id. at *5. The
Court further added that “the OSM and the presiding special master will strictly
manage these proceedings in an effort to resolve the causation issues in less than the
allotted two-year time period.” Id.
125. See Ruling Concerning Issue of Time at 3, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism
Master File (Fed. Cl. Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/autism/Ruling%20Concerning%20Issue%20of%20Time.pdf
(noting that the actual course of the OAP had “quite obviously” deviated from the
initial schedule and stating that the discovery process has taken much longer than
initially expected).
126. The discovery process was completed in early 2007, well over three years
beyond the original timeline. See Autism Update-March 14, 2007, supra note 16, at 2
(“[W]e are very pleased to report that the production process was completed on
February 12, 2007.”) (emphasis in original).
127. See id. at 5 (dividing evidence into three different theories “(1) that MMR
vaccines and thimerosal-containing vaccines can combine to cause autism . . . (2) that
MMR vaccines alone can cause autism, and (3) that thimerosal-containing vaccines
alone can cause autism”). The three theories that will be heard are whether
(1) MMR vaccines and thimerosal-containing vaccines can combine to cause autism;
(2) that MMR vaccines alone can cause autism; and (3) that thimerosal containing
vaccines alone can cause autism. Id. In September 2008, however, the Vaccine Court
announced it was no longer necessary to hold hearings in third theory because it was
not distinct in any way from the first two theories. Autism Update-September 29,
2008, supra note 17, at 3.
128. See Notice Regarding Reassignment, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that with
three special masters deciding the test cases all pertinent medical and legal issues will
be thoroughly examined). There, Special Master Hastings wrote that:
To ensure that the Federal Circuit has the broadest perspective and clearest
understanding of the issues presented to the special masters . . . the
undersigned has decided, after much thought and discussion with the other
special masters, to assign two additional special masters to hear and decide
the issues presented in the test cases.
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November 14, 2008, no decision had been issued in Cedillo or any
other test case.
II. THE EARLY STAGES OF THE OMNIBUS AUTISM PROCEEDING
As highlighted above, the framework of the OAP represented a
departure from how the Vaccine Court is generally structured to
129
handle claims. In fact, in the months following the creation of the
OAP, the Vaccine Court faced challenges to the legality of the OAP
and issued three decisions upholding its authority to process claims
in this fashion. Namely, the Vaccine Court affirmed its jurisdiction
over thimerosal claims, upheld the validity of “short-form petitions,”
and modified its practice regarding issuing “decisions” to dissuade
claimants from leaving Vaccine Court. While these decisions may
have made practical sense in the short-term, they lay the foundation
for problems that may arise in the aftermath of the OAP.
A. The Vaccine Court Concludes it has Jurisdiction over Thimerosal
One of the first decisions reached after the creation of the OAP
130
was in Leroy v. Secretary of Health & Human Services. The issue there
was whether injuries resulting from thimerosal were “vaccine-related”
and therefore whether such injuries properly belonged in the
131
As discussed above, the Vaccine Court has
Vaccine Court.
jurisdiction only over those claims that allege a “vaccine-related”
injury. The Vaccine Act defines the term “vaccine-related,” and that
definition specifically excludes injuries resulting from an “adulterant
132
or contaminant intentionally added” to a vaccine.
In Leroy, Chief
133
Special Master Golkiewicz concluded that injuries from thimerosal
were “vaccine-related,” and that the “thimerosal preservative in
Id. at 2.
129. See supra Part I.C (describing the statutory framework of the Vaccine Act).
130. No. 02-392, 2002 WL 31730680 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 11, 2002).
131. Id. at *1. In Leroy, the claimant argued that injuries caused specifically by
thimerosal were not “vaccine-related” injuries and therefore could be brought
initially in state or district courts. Id.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1) (2006) (describing who may bring a suit and
the procedures those plaintiffs must follow). The Vaccine Act states the term
“vaccine related” does not include “an illness, injury, condition or death associated
with an adulterant or contaminant intentionally added to such a vaccine.” Id.
§ 300aa-33(5).
133. The petition in Leroy was filed on April 24, 2002, about two months before
the creation of the OAP, and assigned to Chief Special Master Golkiewicz. Leroy,
2002 WL 31730680, at *1. Special Master Hastings subsequently added the decision
in Leroy to the autism master file. Ruling by the Chief Special Master in Leroy v.
Secretary of HHS at 1, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Nov. 22,
2002), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/
Leroy%201.pdf.
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vaccines is not an ‘adulterant’ or ‘contaminant’ under [section]
134
Therefore, injuries resulting from
33(5) of the Vaccine Act.”
135
thimerosal properly fell within the Vaccine Court’s jurisdiction.
The reasoning in Leroy is justified on a number of different
grounds. The Chief Special Master grounded his ruling in common
136
definitions of relevant statutory language, congressionally stated
137
138
139
Vaccine Act goals, relevant scientific evidence, and case law. In
particular, the Chief Special Master emphasized how thimerosal is
actually the “antithesis” of an adulterant or contaminant because
thimerosal is actually used to preserve vaccines in order to prevent
140
Further, the Chief Special
against adulteration or contamination.
Master showed that the ordinary meaning of “vaccine” would include
preservatives because a vaccine is generally defined as a “suspension”
or “preparation” composed of both micro-organisms and additional
141
Interestingly, shortly after Leroy was issued, Congress
ingredients.
134. See Leroy, 2002 WL 31730680, at *17 (declaring that “any injury or death
arising from the thimerosal component is encompassed within the statutory
definition”).
135. See id. (stating the petitioners are “obligated to either submit to this court’s
jurisdiction for 240 days . . . or until a judgment is rendered, whichever occurs first”).
The court further added that “petitioners alleging an injury or death from the
thimerosal preservative in vaccines are statutorily obligated to file their claim against
a manufacturer or administrator of the vaccine in the Court of Federal Claims, in the
first instance.” Id.
136. See id. at *5 (“Applying accepted canons of statutory interpretation and
following a review of common dictionary definitions of the terms ‘adulterant’ and
‘contaminant’, the court finds that a preservative is not an intentionally added
ingredient of the vaccine meant to make impure, inferior, or contaminated the
vaccine end product.”)
137. See id. at *10 (noting pending Vaccine Act legislation in Congress). The
Chief Special Master added that Congress, not the Vaccine Court, has the power to
exclude the thimerosal preservative from the scope of the Vaccine Act. Id.
138. See id. at *12 (relying on evidence from the FDA and the Institute of
Medicine to conclude “pertinent evidence from the scientific community tends to
refute petitioners’ claims that thimerosal is a separate entity of a vaccine or that it is
an ‘adulterant’ or ‘contaminant’ within the meaning of the Vaccine Act”). Indeed,
FDA regulations treat preservatives as a constituent part of vaccines, not as
adulterants. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 610.15 (2007) (stating that “[p]roducts in multiple
dose containers shall contain a preservative”).
139. E.g., Liu v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(“[I]t appears every federal court to have ruled on the issue has held injuries
resulting from thimerosal contained in vaccines are vaccine-related under the
meaning of the Vaccine Act.”); Owens ex rel. Schafer v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 203
F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (opining that because the alleged injuries were
linked to a vaccine ingredient, the injuries are necessarily vaccine-related). Both
these opinions were cited in Leroy to buttress the argument that thimerosal is neither
an adulterant nor a contaminant. 2002 WL 31730680, at *6.
140. Leroy, 2002 WL 31730680, at *7 (arguing that thimerosal actually prevents
corruption of the vaccines and that vaccines “sold in multiple-does vials indeed must”
contain a preservative such as thimerosal) (citation omitted).
141. See id. at *8–9 (citing dictionaries to show how the ordinary usage of the term
vaccine “strongly implies the inclusion of bacterium and additional ingredients”).
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amended section 33 of the Vaccine Act, the section containing the
definitions, to make sure thimerosal injuries were covered under the
Act by narrowing the definition of “adulterant” or “contaminant,”
and broadening the definition of “vaccine manufacturer” to include
institutions that manufacture a component or ingredient of any
142
vaccine. The amendments, however, were short-lived and repealed
143
a few months later. Legislative maneuvering aside, the main result
of Leroy was that every potential claimant wanting to bring a
thimerosal-vaccine claim was now obligated to go to the Vaccine
144
Court instead of federal district court or state court. Thus, because
so many thimerosal claims were looming in the background, the
Vaccine Court had to consider the administrative effect of the
145
potential influx of thousands of autism claims.
B. The Decision to Utilize Short-Form Petitions
Shortly after the creation of the OAP, the Vaccine Court, through
an Order issued by Chief Special Master Golkiewicz, announced that
it would permit the filing of “short-form petitions” in the course of
146
the OAP.
Such short-form petitions would not include the
142. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1714–1717, 116 Stat.
2135, 2320–2321 (2002). For example, the definition of manufacturer was
broadened to include institutions that manufacture “any vaccine set forth in the
Vaccine Injury table, including any component or ingredient of any such vaccine.” Id.
(emphasis added). Similarly, section 33(5) was amended by adding language stating
that “an adulterant or contaminant shall not include any component or ingredient
listed in a vaccine’s product license application or product label.” Id. The provision
was attached to a large bill, and provides an interesting glimpse into federal
lawmaking. See Ferguson v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760–61 (E.D.
Ky. 2006) (describing the legislative circumstances behind the Vaccine Act
amendments); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Capitol Hill Mystery: Who Aided Drug Maker?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, at A35 (“[I]n a city where politicians have perfected the art
of claiming credit for deeds large and small, not a single member of Congress—or
the Bush administration—will admit to being the author of the [Eli] Lilly rider.”).
143. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 102(c),
117 Stat. 11, 528 (2003). The amendment noted, however, that it was a “nonprejudicial repeal” and specifically added that “[n]o inference shall be drawn” that
this amendment “affects any change in that prior law, or that Leroy v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services . . . was incorrectly decided.” Id.
144. See Owens, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (holding that the plaintiffs “are required to
file a [Vaccine Act] petition as a pre-requisite to filing any civil action seeking
damages from the Vaccine Manufacturers for injuries to their children”).
145. See Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 1, 2002 WL 31696785, at *1
(noting the “influx of Program claims” and the potential for thousands more).
Having such an influx would likely impose a hardship on the limited resources of the
Vaccine Court, which is limited to no more than eight special masters. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-12(c)(1) (2006).
146. See generally Discussion of Issue of Short-Form Petitions at 1-4, Omnibus Autism
Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. July 8, 2002), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/Autism-ORD-20020708Discussion%20of%20Short%20Forms.pdf. According to the Vaccine Court, “[n]o

2008]

MERCURY RISING

487

“affidavit[] and supporting documentation” listed in section 11(c) of
the Act and instead would consist only of a claimant’s name and the
statement that he is adopting the master autism petition for vaccine
147
compensation.
A few months later, in Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Secretary of Health &
148
Human Services, Special Master Hastings upheld the validity of
149
“short-form petitions” under the terms of the Vaccine Act. In that
case, after a claim was filed using a “short-form petition,” the
government moved to dismiss the claim arguing that because the
short-form petition was not accompanied by an “affidavit[] and
supporting documentation” it violated section 11(c) of the Vaccine
150
Special Master Hastings rejected the government’s argument
Act.
and relied on three main rationales to support his decision. First, he
referenced “the history of the Program” to show that the government
generally did not move to dismiss non-autism claims filed without
151
medical records. Second, Special Master Hastings downplayed the
language from section 11(c) of the Act defining what a petition is and
152
what documents should accompany it; instead, he emphasized the
discretion allotted to him under section 12(d), which provides that a
special master can require the submission of evidence and other
153
Finally,
information that may be “reasonable and necessary.”
Special Master Hastings pointed to a change in the Rules of the Court

medical records need to be filed with such a short-form petition, though each
petitioner or his counsel is encouraged to assemble, organize, and keep all relevant
medical records so that they will be available for filing.” Autism General Order #1, at
7, 2002 WL 31696785, at *6.
147. A sample template of a short-form petition is available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/Autism+General+Order1.
pdf (turn to page 11 of the PDF file).
148. No. 02-819V, 2002 WL 31965743, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2002).
149. Id. at *11.
150. Id. at *3.
151. See id. at *4 (“In a great many Program cases (probably a substantial majority)
petitions have been filed with some medical records, but not all of those necessary
for processing the case.”). In addition, Special Master Hastings criticized the
government by commenting that:
[i]t is confusing to me how [the government] can take the position in this
case that I have no discretion to do anything but dismiss the petition, but in
other cases in which petitions were filed without medical records, [the
government] to this day seems to have no objection to processing the cases.
Id. at *4 n.6.
152. See id. at *5 (“These provisions, thus, specifically give the special master broad
discretion to determine the timing of submission of evidence in a Program
proceeding, which evidence will nearly always include medical records.”).
153. Id. at *5 (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B) (2006)
(noting that in conducting a proceeding on a petition a special master may require
such evidence as may be reasonable and necessary).
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of Federal Claims to show that he did not need to dismiss a petition
154
filed without medical records.
The reasoning in Stewart is questionable for a number of reasons.
For one, the opinion’s criticism of the government’s motion to
dismiss is unfair because nothing in the Vaccine Act forces the
155
government to take uniform positions when defending claims.
Furthermore, the opinion relies on incorrect logic because having
discretion to order the filing of some “reasonable and necessary”
records does not mean there is authority to control the filing of all
records, especially when the later records are specifically enumerated
in section 11(c), a provision of the Act that makes no mention of the
156
In addition, it is possible the opinion
special master’s discretion.
amounts to an impermissible judicial modification of a federal statute
inasmuch as the short-form petitions waive the requirements of
157
And finally, because as a waiver of sovereign
section 11(c).
immunity the terms of the Vaccine Act must be strictly construed,
158
Stewart may be incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation.
154. See Stewart, 2002 WL 31965743, at *5 (“[T]here is nothing in the statute or
the rules of this court indicating that when a Program petition is filed without
medical records, it must automatically be dismissed.”).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13 (providing the guidelines for determining
compensation and making no mention of whether the government is obligated to
take uniform positions over time). More broadly, one principle of administrative law
is that agencies are free to modify their legal positions regarding the statutes they
administer. See Bigelow v. Dep’t of Def., 217 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(observing that an agency’s litigation position need not represent some longstanding
agency practice); Mesa Verde Const. Co. v. N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861
F.2d 1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that administrative
agencies can “bend with the political winds” and that agencies “can change their
outlook as often and easily as a chameleon changes its color”).
156. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(allowing the special master to order
the filing of such documents that “may be reasonable and necessary”), with id.
§ 300aa-11(c) (describing specific documents that “shall” accompany a petition such
as an “affidavit[] and supporting documentation”). Moreover, the discretion
mentioned in section 12(d)—the linchpin behind Special Master Hastings
decision—is prefaced by the phrase “[i]n conducting proceedings on a petition” which
necessarily incorporates the petition requirements expressly defined in section 11(c)
of the Act. Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(emphasis added).
157. Vaccine Court precedent and the Vaccine Rules make clear that special
masters are not at liberty to change a statute enacted by Congress and further that
they may only regulate matters not specifically provided for in the Vaccine Rules. See
VACCINE R. FED. CL. 1 (noting the Chief Special Master is permitted to regulate the
applicable practice only in matters not specifically provided for in the Vaccine
Rules); Greider v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 23 Cl. Ct. 348, 350
(1991) (declaring that special masters are “not at liberty to change a statute enacted
by Congress. . . . [when] the language of the statue is crystal clear and it is supported
by the legislative history, the court must defer to its clear meaning”).
158. See United States v. Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (noting waivers of
sovereign immunity should be construed strictly and in favor of the sovereign).
Therefore, when section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act says a petition “shall” contain
various supporting documentation, the obvious meaning is that these documents will
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However, because neither party appealed the decision, the ruling
stood and short-form petitions were allowed.
C. The Decision Not to Issue “Decisions”
While the Vaccine Act takes initial jurisdiction over
“vaccine-related” claims, it provides two main ways to opt out of
Vaccine Court before a special master issues a decision. First, under
sections 12(g) and 21(b), a petitioner may withdraw from Vaccine
Court if the special master has not made a decision on his petition in
159
240 days. And second, under Rule 21 of the Vaccine Rules for the
Court of Federal Claims, a petitioner may voluntarily dismiss his
160
claim at any time without an order by the special master.
These opt out mechanisms provide a way for some petitioners to
litigate their claims outside the Vaccine Court in either state or
federal civil court. Indeed, some petitioners may prefer to litigate
their vaccine claims in state court because there they would be able to
161
obtain discovery documents from the vaccine manufacturers, be
entitled to a jury trial (which might be more sympathetic given the
162
nature of vaccine injury claims), and be eligible for greater
163
damages awards.
164
In Currie v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, Special Master
Hastings concluded he would not issue “decisions” to claimants who
165
elect to withdraw from the Program pursuant to Vaccine Rule 21.
Special Master Hastings did this to indicate that petitioners who left
be provided at the time of filing and not at some subsequent point further in the
litigation. Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(g)(1).
160. See VACCINE R. FED. CL. 21 (providing for the voluntary dismissal option).
161. Discovery documents from vaccine manufacturers were largely denied to
plaintiffs in the course of the OAP. See supra note 24 (providing examples of various
discovery requests that were denied).
162. The Vaccine Act does not provide for jury trials; the special master makes
both findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d) (describing
one of the duties of the special masters as issuing findings of fact). But see generally
Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318 (Kan. 1986) (reversing a jury award of
ten million dollars to a person injured by a vaccine in state court).
163. The Vaccine Act caps pain and suffering awards at $250,000 and does not
allow for punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2). By contrast, many jury
verdicts result in compensatory and punitive damages awards far greater than the
statutory amount set in the Vaccine Act. Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1320; W. Kip Viscusi,
The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405, 1428 tbl.1 (2004)
(surveying sixty-four instances of juries awarding $100 million or more in punitive
damages).
164. No. 02-838V, 2003 WL 23218074, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 26, 2003).
165. Id. at *5.
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the OAP by voluntarily dismissing their claims would still be barred
from filing a civil claim because they did not meet the “judgment”
166
Rather than issue a
requirement set forth in section 11(a).
“decision,” Special Master Hastings declared he would issue either an
Order Dismissing the Vaccine Petition or an Order Concluding
167
Under this system, the clerk of the
Proceedings on the Merits.
Court of Federal Claims was instructed not to enter a judgment on
the claim.
As Special Master Hastings recognized, the decision in Currie does
not completely foreclose filing a civil action after withdrawing from
168
Vaccine Court. Indeed, a close reading of section 11(a) establishes
two mandatory requirements and one either/or requirement that
must be met before commencing a civil action outside the Vaccine
169
Court.
The two mandatory requirements are that a plaintiff
(1) files a petition (2) in accordance with section 16 of the Vaccine
170
Act. In addition, a petitioner must show either (1) that the Court of
Federal Claims issued a judgment on the petition and that judgment
was subsequently rejected or (2) he withdrew the petition under
171
section 21(b). Therefore, in light of the second permissive option
available under section 11(a), the plaintiff may still withdraw under
section 21(b) of the Vaccine Act and be able to commence a civil
172
action.

166. Under section 12(e)(3) of the Vaccine Act, the special master’s “decision”
triggers the issuance of a judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(3).
167. Currie, 2003 WL 23218074, at *5.
168. See id. at *4 (indicating that Congress’s intent was that petitioners at least wait
out the 240-day period before being authorized to withdraw from the Vaccine Act
and commence a civil action).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2).
170. Id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A).
171. Compare id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A)(i) (permitting withdrawal if the Court of
Federal Claims has issued a judgment under section 12 and the claimant elects to
withdraw under section 21(a)), with id. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A)(ii) (permitting
withdrawal if such a person elects to withdraw such a petition under section 21(b)).
Moreover, Special Master Hastings expressly acknowledged the Vaccine Act is
designed to allow petitioners to leave Vaccine Court without ever obtaining a
judgment. See Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-819V,
2003 WL 22300298, at *13–14 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3, 2003) (discussing how a petitioner
may use section 21 to treat the Vaccine Court “as a 240-day delay before filing a tort
suit” and that Congress “certainly understood that such a scenario might take
place”).
172. Indeed, under section 21(b)(2) a petitioner may withdraw from the Vaccine
Court if “the court fails to enter a judgment under section 300aa-12 of this title on
the petition within 420 days” excluding time for suspension and time on remand.
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(b)(2); see also Stewart, 2003 WL 22300298, at *14 (noting a
petitioner who withdraws after 240 days using section 21 “would still undoubtedly be
free to file his tort suit”).
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III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OMNIBUS
AUTISM PROCEEDING
As demonstrated above, there are several statutory twists and turns
in section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act that govern the ability of
claimants to leave Vaccine Court and pursue civil actions.
Interestingly, when these provisions combine with the three decisions
discussed above, as well as the length of time it has taken to conduct
the OAP, the results could be problematic for petitioners looking to
leave the Vaccine Court and file a civil claim. Indeed, as explored
below, a scenario could develop where a plaintiff withdraws from the
OAP intending to file a civil lawsuit but is barred from doing so
because of two unmet requirements from section 11(a). Namely, the
plaintiff never filed a “petition” under the Vaccine Act and further he
173
never did so “in accordance with” section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
Further, if the plaintiff is sent back to Vaccine Court to exhaust his
remedies there, the claim may even be dismissed by the Vaccine
Court because it is either time-barred under the Vaccine Act’s statute
of limitations, or in violation of section 11(b)(2) of the Vaccine Act,
174
which limits claims to one petition per vaccine.
The following
illustration shows how this might happen.
Consider the following hypothetical series of events. Parents of a
child diagnosed with autism hear about the Vaccine Act and file a
claim for vaccine compensation in Vaccine Court on September 1,
175
2002, and enter into the OAP.
Because of the decision in Leroy,
they file the claim in Vaccine Court rather than in state or federal
176
district court. Further, relying on the reasoning and procedure set
forth in General Order #1 and the decision in Stewart, they elect to
177
utilize a short-form petition and do not submit any medical records.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (setting forth the requirements that must be
met before filing a civil action outside Vaccine Court).
174. See infra Part III.D (providing a hypothetical to demonstrate how a plaintiff
might be prevented from re-entering the Vaccine Court).
175. Indeed, there was a surge of short-form petitions filed in the OAP in the
aftermath of General Order #1. Compare Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 2,
2002 WL 31696785, at *2 (noting that more than 400 cases were filed as of July
2002), with Stewart, 2003 WL 22300298, at *3 (noting that more than 2500 short-form
petitions had been filed by August 2003). Also, assume for the purposes of this
scenario that the first symptoms and ultimate diagnosis of autism all occurred in
2002, therefore making the claim timely filed in light of section 16(a)(2) of the
Vaccine Act.
176. See Owens ex rel. Schafer v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 748, 759
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that claims against vaccine manufacturers fall squarely
within the jurisdiction of the Vaccine Court).
177. Moreover, on several occasions throughout the OAP they are not told to file
medical records by the court. E.g., Autism Update-January 17, 2008, supra note 17, at
3 (emphasizing that the Vaccine Court is still not instructing all petitioners in the
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Then, although concerned that the OAP is moving very slowly
178
through the discovery process, the family decides not to withdraw
from the OAP due to the fear they will be barred from a subsequent
179
civil action under the opinion in Currie. More than six years pass as
their claim languishes in the OAP while the Vaccine Court oversees
discovery, receives expert reports, and hears Cedillo and the other test
180
cases. Moreover, throughout this time the family is repeatedly told
181
by the Vaccine Court they do not need to file medical records.
Then, perhaps sometime in the fall of 2008, imagine Cedillo is
decided in favor of the government. At this point, now more than six
years after filing their short-form petition, the plaintiffs decide they
are sufficiently frustrated with the Vaccine Court and elect to
182
withdraw their petition under section 21(b) of the Vaccine Act. A
OAP to file medical records). The rationale for this is that the petitioners’ steering
committee was in process of developing the scientific case over the general causation
inquiry. See Ruling Concerning Issue of Time for Filing Expert Reports at 7, Omnibus
Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Aug. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/Ruling%20Concerning%
20Issue%20of%20Time.pdf (“I see no reason not to let these petitioners keep their
petitions pending.”).
178. The discovery process took over four years to complete. See Autism UpdateMarch 14, 2007, supra note 16, at 2 (“[E]fforts to produce material proceeded
slowly . . . but we are now very pleased to report that the production process was
completed on February 12, 2007.”). Interestingly, according to one of the lawyers
representing the petitioners, the discovery documents that were ultimately obtained
were “a haystack without a needle—useless.” Mauro, supra note 2.
179. See Currie v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-838V, 2003 WL
23218074, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 26, 2003) (“It would certainly seem to contravene the
Congressional intent [of the Program] if a party could file a petition, voluntarily
dismiss it the next day, and receive a ‘judgment’ that would entitle the party to then
file a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer or administrator.”).
180. For some insight into the delays encountered in the early stages of the OAP,
see Ruling Concerning Issue of Time for Filing Expert Reports, supra note 177, at 3–
4. There, Special Master Hastings attributed some of the delays in the OAP to the
petitioners’ “very extensive initial request for production of materials from
government files, and later an extensive second request.” Id. at 3. Also accounting
for some of the delay was the government’s “lengthy and cumbersome procedure
involving review of the [discovery documents] (1) by FDA personnel, (2) by
Department of Justice personnel, and (3) by personnel of the vaccine manufacturer
that originally submitted the material for the license application.” Id. at 4.
181. See Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 7, 2002 WL 31696785, at *6
(“No medical records need be filed with such a short-form petition . . . .”); Autism
Update-January 17, 2007, supra note 117, at 3 (“We again stress that at this time we will
NOT be ordering records to be filed in ALL of the pending autism cases.”). More recently,
the special masters are selecting about 200 petitioners per month and asking them to
file medical records; however the special masters are not requiring records to be
filed in all pending OAP cases. See Autism Update-March 27, 2008, supra note 111, at
3–4 (discussing the process for submitting medical records but emphasizing that not
all petitioners are required to submit records).
182. Indeed, it is entirely possible that no action will have been taken on plaintiffs’
short-form petition, despite it sitting in the OAP for over six years. The Cedillos, for
instance, filed their claim in 1998 and waited almost a decade for a hearing. Mauro,
supra note 2; see also Wacek, supra note 106, at 326 (“The ‘hurry up and wait’ nature
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short time later they initiate a civil action directly against a vaccine
183
manufacturer by filing a complaint in state or federal district court.
If this scenario—which is likely given indications made by lawyers
184
involved in the OAP as well as the limited money available in the
185
vaccine trust fund —transpires, these hypothetical plaintiffs can
expect to encounter several problems with their civil action because
186
they have not exhausted their options under the Vaccine Act. First
of these vaccine/autism cases leaves parents in an uncomfortable dilemma because
on one hand, their own attorneys [were] asking for time to compile scientific
evidence that should be favorable to their clients; and on the other hand, these
parents often need immediate relief to help pay for the medical costs of caring for
their autistic children.”).
183. This portion of the scenario would work equally well if the plaintiffs prevail in
any of the test cases before the Vaccine Court. For instance, a plaintiff may want to
leverage a favorable decision from the Vaccine Court in a subsequent civil action
where he may have different legal rights than in Vaccine Court. See supra notes 161–
163 (discussing the differing treatment plaintiffs receive in Vaccine Court when
compared to typical civil actions). Moreover, because his claim will have been
pending for far more than 240 days, he will be entitled to withdraw under sections
12(g) and 21(b) withdrawal mechanism, and further according to the analysis above
he will not be barred by not having a judgment. See supra Part II.C (describing why
the decision in Currie v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2003 WL 23218074, at *1
(Fed. Cl. Nov. 26, 2003) leaves open the option of filing a civil action).
184. Indeed, statements from several attorneys involved in the autism litigation
indicate strong interest in bringing claims in civil court in the aftermath of the OAP.
See Myron Levin, Taking it to Vaccine Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, at A24 (quoting
Kevin Conway, a lawyer representing numerous OAP petitioners, saying vaccine
“companies ‘are terrified’ of huge jury awards”); Kay Lazar, Parents Seeking Dose of
Precaution on Vaccines Urge Banning Use of Mercury, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2005, at 8
(quoting Jan Schlichtmann, a prominent trial attorney, saying “what goes into
vaccines is of great interest to me”); Young, supra note 110, at A14 (quoting a lawyer
representing several families saying the government’s concession of liability was
“potentially explosive”). Furthermore, as far back as 2002, a Justice Department
attorney involved in the OAP characterized one of the petitioners’ filings as an
attempt to gain “enhanced rights in a subsequent civil action.” Todd Zwillich, U.S.
Government Asks Court to Seal Vaccine Records, REUTERS HEALTH, Nov. 26, 2002,
http://www.whale.to/a/vacc.html.
185. Simple calculation demonstrates that there is currently not enough money in
the Vaccine Trust Fund to compensate the approximately 4900 claims should the
special masters find in their favor. For example, government data shows there is
currently $2.5 billion in the trust and further that the average award paid out under
the Vaccine Act is more than $848,000. NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM, supra note 90. Therefore, assuming each of the 4900 claims receives an
award equal to the average payment of $848,000, the total would come to more than
$4.2 billion dollars, far beyond the amount currently available in the vaccine trust
fund. Moreover, because the cost of caring for someone with autism over their
entire life is far more than $848,000, it seems the $4.2 billion liability figure could be
a very low estimate. See supra note 103 (drawing on data suggesting it takes about
$3.2 million to care for a single person with autism over their lifetime). Thus, there
may be added incentive to bring a civil claim against a vaccine manufacturer, who
has more assets than the Vaccine Trust Fund. E.g., Aaron Smith, Merck Profit Strong,
Sales Weak, CNN, Apr. 21, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/21/news/
companies/merck/?postversion=2008042108 (reporting the drug maker and vaccine
manufacturer Merck earned $3.3 billion in the first quarter of 2008).
186. In fact, because a number of the approximately 4900 vaccine claimants are
acting in a pro se capacity, it is entirely possible the legal nuances of sections 11, 16,
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of all, the plaintiffs never filed a “petition” as that term is specifically
187
defined in section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act. And second, they did
not file their claim in Vaccine Court “in accordance with” section 16
188
of the Vaccine Act.
Moreover, because any due process or equal
protection claims the plaintiffs might raise are unlikely to succeed,
the court entertaining the civil action will have no choice but to
189
Finally, if the
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for lack of jurisdiction.
plaintiffs decide to re-enter Vaccine Court, they may be prevented
from doing so because their claims are either prohibited by the one
petition rule in section 11(b)(2) or made untimely under the Vaccine
190
Act’s statute of limitations.
A. The Plaintiffs Never Filed a “Petition” Under Section 11
of the Vaccine Act
As discussed above, in order to properly leave the Vaccine Court,
and thereby free themselves to file a civil action, the plaintiffs will
191
need to meet the requirements of section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act.
The first requirement is that plaintiffs cannot file a civil claim against
a vaccine manufacturer unless they first file a “petition” in the
192
With the decision in Stewart in mind, one likely
Vaccine Court.
defense a defendant-manufacturer may raise is that the plaintiffs’
and 21 of the Vaccine Act may slip past them. See Heston ex rel. Heston v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 41, 46 (1998) (“It is the experience of this court
that petitioners under the Vaccine Act often are unfamiliar with litigation and have little
experience with attorneys.”) (emphasis added); see also Turpin ex rel. Turpin v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., No. 99-564V, 2005 WL 1026714, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 10,
2005) (“Due to the complex nature of the Vaccine Act’s statutory scheme, this Court
encourages pro se petitioners to seek legal representation.”); Flores v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 52 Fed. Cl. 294, 298 n.3 (2002) (“The court hopes that based on
this opinion, the pro se petitioner can more fully understand the decisions reached by
the court and the special master.”). Even experienced attorneys sometimes struggle
with the contours of the Vaccine Act. See Ray v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 04-184V, 2006 WL 1006587, at *10 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2006) (lamenting
certain “lapses in performance” with respect to an attorney with ample Vaccine Act
experience).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (2006).
188. Id. § 300aa-16.
189. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998)
(discussing the importance of addressing jurisdiction before proceeding to the
merits of a case).
190. See infra Part III.D (discussing barriers plaintiffs would face trying to return to
the Vaccine Court).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (requiring the plaintiff to first file a petition in
accordance with section 16 and then receive a judgment under section 12 before
being able to properly leave the Vaccine Court); see also supra notes 167–172 and
accompanying text (describing the impediments to a civil action imposed by section
11(a) of the Vaccine Act).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (“No person may bring a civil action . . .
unless a petition has been filed.”).
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claim must be dismissed because a “short-form petition” is not a
“petition” under the Vaccine Act—meaning the state or federal court
does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Challenging the validity of short-form petitions might be an
appealing and persuasive legal argument from the perspective of a
vaccine manufacturer. Indeed, even Chief Special Master Golkiewicz
recognized that short-form petitions contain far less information than
193
traditional petitions. For example, even when completely filled out,
short-form petitions do not contain an affidavit and make no
mention of the type of vaccine received, when or where the vaccine
194
was received, or the timing or onset of any medical symptoms. This
falls far short of the specific definition of “petition” in section 11(c)
of the Vaccine Act, namely that a petition “shall” be accompanied by
an “affidavit[] and supporting documentation” which must include
an assortment of medical documents, such as pre- and post-injury
195
physician records and doctor’s notes.
Similarly, the Rules of the
Court of Federal Claims make clear that Vaccine Act petitions “shall”
196
As such, the utter lack of required
be filed with medical records.
medical documentation is one reason to suggest a short-form petition
is not technically a petition filed under section 11(c) of the Vaccine
197
Act.
Furthermore, challenging the validity of short-form petitions could
draw support from a variety of other legal sources. For instance,
casting doubt upon the adequacy of short-form petitions would align
with the interpretation of the Vaccine Act the government set forth
in its briefs filed in Stewart. There, referring to the petition
193. See Discussion of Issue of Short-Form Petitions, supra note 146, at 1, (“The
short-form petition would not contain a detailed account of the relevant vaccinations
and the history of the vaccinee’s disorder, nor would it be accompanied by the
medical records of the vaccinee’s injury.”).
194. For an analysis of a short-form petition compared to a regular petition, see
infra note 197 and accompanying text.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (listing medical records that “shall” accompany a
petition).
196. See VACCINE R. FED. CL. 2(e) (noting that every petition “shall” be
accompanied by the records described in section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act).
197. Compare
Sample
Short
Form
Petition,
available
at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/OSM/Autism/Autism%20General%20Order1.pdf
(turn to page 11 of the PDF file), with 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (stating that a petition
“shall contain . . . an affidavit[] and supporting documentation . . . [including]
maternal prenatal and delivery records, newborn hospital records (including all
physicians’ and nurses’ notes and test results), vaccination records associated with
the vaccine allegedly causing the injury, pre- and post-injury physician or clinic
records (including all relevant growth charts and test results), all post-injury
inpatient and outpatient records (including all provider notes, test results, and
medication records), if applicable, a death certificate, and if applicable, autopsy
results”).
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requirements in section 11(c), the government argued that “the law
is clear petitions must be filed with an affidavit and supporting
documentation” and the “short form petition clearly does not meet
198
this statutory requirement.” It is well established that an executive
agency’s interpretation of the statute it is entrusted to administer
constitutes a body of expertise and informed judgment and may be
199
entitled to some respect. Indeed, even a government legal brief is
200
Furthermore, neither state
eligible for some form of deference.
nor federal district courts are bound by decisions reached by special
masters and therefore are not obliged to follow the decision in

198. Order Placing Additional Filings of Respondent Concerning Stewart into
Master File at 6, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Oct. 20,
2003), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/
Order%20Placing%20More%20of%20Respondents%20Stewart%20Filings%20into%
20Master%20File.pdf.
The government also argued that because short-form
petitions do not oblige the petitioners to identify the vaccine received, when it was
received, or the nature or timing of the onset of symptoms, they do not permit the
Court to make even threshold determinations regarding its jurisdiction. See id. at 4–5
(citing a copy of the respondent’s motion to dismiss); see also Order Placing
Respondent’s Filings Concerning Stewart Into Master File at 4, Omnibus Autism
Proceeding, Autism Master File (Fed. Cl. Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/autism/Order%20Placing%20Res
pondents%20Stewart%20Filings%20into%20Master%20File.pdf (arguing that a
proceeding for compensation under the Vaccine Act “shall be initiated” by the filing
of a petition containing the matter prescribed by subsection (c)).
199. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 591 (2000) (“What we said in
a case involving an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations applies equally, in
my view, to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute . . . .”); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001) (observing that the views of an
Administrator of a program “constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”) (citation
omitted); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.”).
200. See Wax v. Aventis Pasteur Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“[T]he court defers, for the purposes of this motion, to [the government’s]
interpretation that injuries caused by thimerosal are ‘vaccine-related’ for the
purposes of the Program.”); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)
(“Petitioners complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to us in the form of
a legal brief; but that does not . . . make it unworthy of deference.”) (emphasis added);
United Seniors Ass’n Inc. v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 965, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Even if the
legal briefs contained the first expression of the agency’s views, under the
appropriate circumstances we would still accord them deference so long as they
represented the agency’s ‘fair and considered judgment on the matter.’”); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The mere fact that
an agency offers its interpretation in the course of litigation does not automatically
preclude deference to the agency.”). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 901 (2001) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s rationale for Chevron clearly precludes giving Chevron deference to
interpretations that are post-hoc rationalizations of agency counsel such as agency
briefs.)
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201

Stewart. And finally, even if the court entertaining the civil lawsuit is
unfamiliar with the Vaccine Act regime, determining whether or not
something is a “petition” is a straightforward legal inquiry requiring
only the comparison of a definitional component of the Vaccine Act
202
with a sample short-form petition.
Thus, in the scenario described above, the hypothetical plaintiffs,
as well as any other plaintiff who has used a short-form petition in the
OAP and is looking to file a civil action, may run into a considerable
obstacle if a manufacturer defendant challenges the validity of a
short-form petition.
B. The Plaintiffs Have Not Filed a Petition “in Accordance with” Section 16
of the Vaccine Act
Even assuming the state or federal court determines that a shortform petition is indeed a “petition” under the Act, the hypothetical
plaintiffs are not yet out of the woods because they must still meet the
second requirement of section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act. That
requirement states that plaintiffs cannot file a civil action unless they
previously filed their petition in Vaccine Court “in accordance with”
203
section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
Section 16 is the statute of
limitations component of the Vaccine Act and states in relevant part
that “no petition may be filed . . . after the expiration of 36 months
after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation
204
Again,
of onset or of the significant aggravation of such injury.”
201. See Wax, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (stating that federal district courts are not
bound by decisions of special masters). Moreover, because the decision upholding
short-form petitions is a legal and not factual determination, any reviewing court
would owe it a reduced level of deference. See Bradley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Claims Court judge
reviews the special master’s decision essentially for legal error . . . .”); see also Rasul v.
Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo.”). Further, when district courts appoint masters under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court would review the special master’s
findings the same way an appellate court would review a district court’s findings. See
Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (declaring that when reviewing
a decision of a special master “the general rule is that the district court steps into the
shoes of an appellate court and employs the same standards that an appellate court
uses to review a lower court opinion.”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit noted a district court would review a special master’s legal decision de novo.
Id.
202. Indeed, courts have shown familiarity understanding and interpreting the
provisions of the Vaccine Act. See Doe v. Bayer Corp., 367 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909–10
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (offering a full and detailed description of the Vaccine Act and
OAP); see also Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing
the legislative history, regulatory structure, and modifications to state tort law
imposed by the Vaccine Act).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (2006).
204. Id. § 300aa-16(a)(2).
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because a short-form petition contains no information that would
allow the Vaccine Court to determine whether a claim was timely
filed, another argument a defendant in a civil action may raise is that
the Vaccine Court never determined whether the claim was timely
filed and therefore the plaintiffs never filed a petition “in accordance
205
with” section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
Returning to the hypothetical scenario, if the only record the
plaintiffs have filed in the Vaccine Court is a short-form petition, it
would be difficult for the state or district court to conclude that this
claim was filed in accordance with section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
Indeed, because the short-form petition does not contain any medical
information, a court cannot ascertain whether the claim was timely
filed because there are no medical records upon which to base the
206
decision. Moreover, even if the plaintiffs file medical records in the
state or district court, determining when the “first symptom or
manifestation of the onset of injury” occurred, especially in the
context of a mysterious disease like autism which develops
207
Further, because
“insidiously over time,” is exceedingly difficult.
the phrases “first symptom” and “manifestation of onset” of symptoms

205. See Reilly ex rel. Reilly v. Wyeth, 876 N.E.2d 740, 751–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(noting that “this language clearly and unambiguously prohibits both an action and
a remedy in state or federal court unless there has been a timely filing with the [Vaccine]
court.”) (emphasis added); see also Strauss v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d
711 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that a late filing in Vaccine Court does not translate
into freedom to sue in civil court); McDonald v. Lederle Labs., 775 A.2d 528, 532–33
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding a failure to file timely a Vaccine Act petition
bars pursuit of a state tort action for vaccine related injury).
206. See Discussion of Issue of Short-Form Petitions, supra note 146, at 2–3
(according to the reasoning of Chief Special Master Golkiewicz, plaintiffs would be
adopting the master petition autism petition and thereby alleging their claim was
timely).
207. Setnes ex rel. Setnes v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 175, 181 (2003). The court
in Setnes underscores the difficult issues involved in determining when the first
symptom or manifestation of onset of first symptom occurs in autism cases. For
instance, under medical standards it is possible to equate routine early childhood
behaviors such as humming, babbling, kicking or screaming as manifestations of the
onset of autism and therefore begin the running of the statute of limitations when a
child is very young; however, the court in Setnes held that the claimant’s autism did
not become manifest until the phrase “concern for [pervasive development
disorder]” was noted in the records. Id. at 181; see also Discussion of Issue of “ShortForm” Petitions, supra note 146, at 3 (“[T]o determine when the first symptom of an
autistic disorder occurred is a question of fact that might be quite complex in many cases.”)
(emphasis added); infra note 209 (describing expertise of special masters). The
Federal Circuit recently provided some clearer guidance as to how to determine
when the first symptom or manifestation of onset occurs. See Markovich v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs, 477 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the first
symptom or manifestation of onset for the purpose of the statute of limitations
period is the first event objectively recognizable as a sign of a vaccine injury by the
medical profession at large).
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208

have different legal meanings, the decision whether a claim was
filed in accordance with section 16 may be best left to the expertise of
209
the Vaccine Court. Thus, in light of these factors, a manufacturer
in a civil action may well put forth the argument that petitioners who
filed a short-form petition never filed a petition in accordance with
section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
As this discussion has indicated, although the court that receives
the first civil action arising in the aftermath of Cedillo may be eager to
examine the compelling scientific and medical issues relating to the
cause of autism, it must first ensure it has proper jurisdiction over the
claim. Thus, if that court accepts either of these jurisdictionally
based arguments, it will have no choice but to dismiss the civil claim
with instructions for the plaintiffs to re-file in the Vaccine Court to
210
exhaust their administrative remedies there.
Accordingly, going
back to the hypothetical plaintiffs, in what would be a strange but
plausible outcome, a state or federal court may find that despite
waiting over six years in the OAP, these plaintiffs have still not
complied with their administrative exhaustion requirements under
211
the Vaccine Act and instruct them to return to Vaccine Court.
C. A Constitutional Challenge to the Omnibus Autism Proceeding is
Unlikely to Succeed
Before deciding to return to the Vaccine Court, the hypothetical
plaintiffs may consider raising a constitutional challenge to the OAP
in the state or federal court. Indeed, one likely argument the
plaintiffs might advance is that the OAP deprives them of due process
because it limits their opportunity to be heard and also deprives them

208. See Markovich, 477 F.3d at 1357 (“A symptom may be indicative of a variety of
conditions or ailments . . . . A manifestation of onset is more self-evident of an injury
and may include significant symptoms that clearly evidence an injury.”).
209. See Sword v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 183, 188 (1999) (observing that “even
more than ordinary fact-finders,” the special masters have a “unique ability . . . to
adjudge cases in light of their own acquired specialized knowledge and expertise”);
see also Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“Congress assigned to a group of specialists, the Special Masters within the Court of
Federal Claims, the unenviable job of sorting through these painful cases and, based
upon their accumulated expertise in the field, judging the merits of the individual
claims.”).
210. See Reilly, 876 N.E.2d at 751 (finding the language of the Vaccine Act
unambiguously prohibits both an action and a remedy in state or federal court unless
there has been a timely filing with the Vaccine Court); see also Dickey v. Connaught
Labs., Inc., 777 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (same).
211. Accord Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 270 (1995) (explaining that a
plaintiff must exhaust the Vaccine Act’s procedures before filing a de novo civil
action in state or federal court).
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212

of their right to bring a tort claim. Alternatively, they might argue
that the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations violates their right to
equal protection because it necessarily treats autism differently from
other injuries. Because the onset of autism is less dramatic and far
more subtle than the onset of other illnesses covered by the Vaccine
213
Act such as encephalopathy or anaphylactic shock, the petitioners
may have less notice that the statute of limitations on their claim is
214
running. While these may appear to be plausible legal arguments,
the legal framework under which a court analyzes a constitutional
challenge to the Vaccine Act, as well as jurisprudence from previous
challenges to the Act, suggests these sorts of legal challenges are
unlikely to succeed.
As an initial matter, the Vaccine Act is reviewed using a “rational
215
basis” standard.
This is the case because the Act is a federally
provided compensation scheme, because it does not implicate any
fundamental rights, and because it does not discriminate on the basis
216
of race or gender. Generally, federal statutes evaluated under this
standard are deemed constitutional if there is any reasonably
conceivable set of facts that could provide a rational basis to support
217
the statute.
Moreover, in the area of social welfare, a statute does

212. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (“Parties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first be notified.”); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful matter.’”).
213. See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2007) (providing a Vaccine Injury Table that shows
for the MMR vaccine, the time period for anaphylactic shock is only four hours and
the time period for encephalopathy is five to fifteen days).
214. See supra note 206 (discussing the difficulties in determining the symptoms or
onset of autism or other pervasive development disorders).
215. Under a rational basis review, the court is required to compare the content of
a statute to its purported purpose, and to determine whether the law constitutes a
reasonable means of accomplishing a legitimate end or purpose of state government.
See, e.g., U.S.A. Baseball v. City of New York, 509 F. Supp. 2d 285, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding that a city ordinance preventing the use of metal baseball bats by high
school students “has a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of protecting
the public safety . . . and therefore the ordinance does not fail”).
216. See Black v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 93 F.3d 781, 787 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[T]he Vaccine Act does not implicate any ‘fundamental right,’ for a ‘noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally
protected status.’”); Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. 328 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656
(S.D. Tex. 2004) (indicating the Vaccine Act is reviewed under a rational basis
standard). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 667–689 (3d ed. 2006) (describing three levels of judicial scrutiny applied
to federal statutes and the legal framework for evaluating cases under the rational
basis standard).
217. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (noting a
classification need not form a perfect fit between means and ends to satisfy rational
basis scrutiny).
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not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect or even if the law works
218
to the disadvantage of a particular group.
While no court has squarely addressed a constitutional challenge to
the OAP, several other aspects of the Vaccine Act have been upheld.
For example, the provision of the Act providing a two-year statute of
limitations provision for claims regarding death, as opposed to a
219
In
longer three-year limit for non-death claims, has been upheld.
addition, the provision allowing administrative rulemaking to amend
220
the Vaccine Injury Table, and the clause setting forth the eligibility
requirement of incurring at least $1,000 in un-reimbursable medical
221
expenses before filing a claim, have been found constitutional
under a rational basis standard of review. Furthermore, two courts
specifically upheld the constitutionality of the Vaccine Act when
faced with equal protection claims challenging how the Vaccine Act’s
statute of limitations treats injuries with latent and subtle onsets such
222
as autism. Finally, with respect to potential due process challenges,
the Act does not deprive plaintiffs of any property right to bring a
tort action because that right only becomes vested once a final

218. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (noting a law will be upheld
under the rational basis standard “even if the law seems unwise or works to the
disadvantage of a particular group”); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970) (“If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the
Constitution simply because . . . ‘in practice it results in some inequality.’”) (quoting
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
219. See Leuz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 63 Fed. Cl. 602 (2005) (holding
that section 16(a)(3) of the Vaccine Act does not violate due process or equal
protection rights because the provision is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose); Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (finding the statute of
limitations provision within the Vaccine Act did not violate due process because the
provision was reasonably calculated to preserve a legislative goal of limiting vaccine
manufacturers’ liability); Reilly v. Wyeth, 876 N.E.2d 740, 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(concluding that there is “no constitutional infirmity with the [Vaccine] Act”).
220. See Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“We therefore conclude that § 300aa -14(c) of the Vaccine Act does not
violate the Presentment Clause.”). In the same case, the Federal Circuit concluded
the authority to modify the Vaccine Injury Table via rulemaking is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See id. at 1314–15 (explaining that
Congress provided ample guidance and limits on the Secretary’s ability to revise the
Vaccine Injury Table).
221. See Black, 93 F.3d at 781 (finding the requirement from section 11 of the Act
that a claimant incur over $1000 in unreimburseable expenses before bringing suit is
constitutional).
222. See Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (“There exists a clear, logical connection
between the means employed–a neutral limitation on claims–and the legislative goal
pursued–limitation of vaccine manufacturers’ exposure to liability.”). The court in
Blackmon concluded that the limitations provision of the Vaccine Act did not violate
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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223

judgment has been entered. And further, plaintiffs in the OAP will
ultimately have an opportunity to be heard, but must wait until after
224
the conclusion of the test cases and the general causation inquiry.
Therefore, because any constitutional challenge to the OAP would
most likely be evaluated under the rational basis standard, and
because the OAP bears a rational relationship to the government
objectives of providing some level of compensation to persons
injured by vaccines while also insuring the stability and predictability
225
of the childhood vaccine system, it is unlikely the hypothetical
plaintiffs would be successful on any sort of constitutional challenge
226
to the Vaccine Act.
D. Plaintiffs May Be Prevented from Re-entering Vaccine Court
At this point, assuming the hypothetical plaintiffs return to Vaccine
227
Court to exhaust their administrative requirements, two additional
problems emerge. First, section 11(b)(2) of the Vaccine Act states
that only one “petition” may be filed with respect to “each
228
administration of a vaccine.”
Thus, according to the Vaccine
Court’s holding in Stewart, the plaintiffs have already filed a “petition”

223. See Leuz, 63 Fed Cl. at 611 (“Because petitioners have not been deprived of
any property right, they suffered no procedural due process violation.”); Reilly, 876
N.E.2d at 754 (observing that the “plaintiffs have not been deprived of any property
right and therefore cannot claim they suffered a due process violation”); see also
Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that “rights in tort
do not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment”); Ducharme v. Merrill-Nat’l
Lab., 574 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[A] plaintiff has no vested right in any
tort claim for damages . . . .”).
224. See Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 3, 2002 WL 31696785, at *3–4
(noting that after the general causation inquiry is done, the court will turn and apply
those standards to the individual cases).
225. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6348 (noting the twin purposes of the Vaccine Act).
226. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 216, at 678 (observing that the Supreme Court
generally has been very deferential to the government when applying the rational
basis test and adding it is very rare for the Supreme Court to find that a law fails the
rational basis test).
227. See Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 270 (1995) (“A claimant alleging
that more than $1,000 in damages resulted from a vaccination . . . must exhaust the
Act’s procedures . . . before filing any de novo civil action in state or federal court.”) (emphasis
added). While it is possible the Vaccine Court will not allow them to refile the
petition—see infra Part III.D—petitioners could get around this obstacle by alleging
a different vaccine was responsible for the alleged injuries. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa11(b)(2) (2006) (“Only one petition may be filed with respect to each administration
of a vaccine.”). Moreover, a due process claim challenging the legitimacy of the
Vaccine Act stands little chance of success. See supra Part III.C (explaining that the
Vaccine act does not deprive plaintiffs of the right to bring a cause of action or any
property and thus the Act is likely to survive a due process challenge).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(2).
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and therefore may be unable to re-enter Vaccine Court. Moreover,
230
even if the plaintiffs manage to avoid this provision, a second
problem develops. Namely, because it has been so long since the
231
original short-form petition was filed, the current claim is timebarred because it is outside the three-year statute of limitations
232
The discussion
period imposed by section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
below explores this outcome in more detail.
A short summary of three recent Supreme Court decisions is
helpful in order to understand the importance of section 16 to the
233
Vaccine Act. First, in 2006, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Supreme
Court considered whether a numerical provision in the Civil Rights
Act formed part of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction or instead was
something that delineated a substantive ingredient of a claim for
234
235
In a unanimous holding, Justice Ginsberg concluded the
relief.
236
provision at issue was a substantive one, not a jurisdictional one.
However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court created a “bright237
line” test for whether a statutory provision is jurisdictional.
According to the test, “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,
238
then courts and litigants will be duly instructed . . . .”
However,
“when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
229. See Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-819V,
2002 WL 31965743, at *11 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2002) (upholding the use of short-form
petitions).
230. In order to find that a petition was ever filed a special master would need to
disagree with the ruling in Stewart. See supra Part II.B (questioning the holding in
Stewart). In the alternative, the plaintiffs could avoid the rule of section 11(b)(2) by
alleging a different vaccine was the cause of the injury. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(2)
(noting the limitations for filing a petition with respect to each vaccine
administered).
231. Indeed, even if the hypothetical claimant was diagnosed with autism the day
the short-form petition was filed, on September 1, 2002, the claim would still be
untimely because it would have needed to be filed by September 1, 2005. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-16(a)(2). In the hypothetical, the plaintiff is trying to re-enter Vaccine Court
in 2008 or 2009, several years beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations
period.
232. See Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (dismissing petition after finding that equitable tolling is not allowed under
the Vaccine Act).
233. 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
234. Id. at 503. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an
employer . . . to discriminate,” amongst other things, on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Employer is defined to include only those having “fifteen or
more employees.” Id. § 2000e(b).
235. The holding was 8-0; Justice Alito did not participate in the case. Arbaugh,
546 U.S. at 502.
236. Id. at 516.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 515.
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jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional
239
240
Second, in Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court
in character.”
held that a federal appeals court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal
when the claimant filed the appeal three days after the relevant
241
statute of limitations period had elapsed. Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion noted that “[j]urisdictional treatment of statutory time limits
242
makes good sense.” Finally, in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
243
States, the Court affirmed a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to consider sua sponte a statute of limitations issue
244
imposed by the Tucker Act.
In language especially relevant to
Vaccine Act proceedings, Justice Breyer noted that some statutes of
limitations “seek not so much to protect a defendant’s case-specific
interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as
facilitating the administration of claims,” and further added that the
Supreme Court “has long interpreted the court of claims limitation
statute as setting forth this . . . more absolute, kind of limitations
245
period.”
Taken together, these decisions establish that section 16 of the
Vaccine Act is a jurisdictional provision that must be considered by
239. Id. at 516. The Vaccine Court considered the impact of Arbaugh in Rydzewski
v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, No. 99-571V, 2007 WL 949759, at *8 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 12, 2007). There, Special Master Moran concluded that the requirements set
out in section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act go to the merits of a case and are not
jurisdictional; however, the opinion did not reach a conclusion regarding the
provisions of section 16. See id. at *4–8 (deciding that jurisdiction is not dependent
upon proof that a petitioner was administered a covered vaccine but rather a
petitioner can establish jurisdiction by putting forth allegations that the petitioner
received a vaccine covered by the program).
240. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
241. See id. at 2362–63 (noting that the time period for filing an appeal is
mandatory and should not be susceptible to equitable modification). In the facts of
that case, the plaintiff was instructed by the judge that he had seventeen days to file
his appeal; however, the rule at issue stated only that the plaintiff had fourteen days
to file an appeal. Id.; FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6).
242. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365. Justice Thomas also noted that “[b]ecause
Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine
when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.” Id.; see also United
States v. Curry, 47 U.S. 106, 113 (1848) (“The power to hear and determine a case
like this is conferred upon the court by acts of Congress . . . and we have no power to
dispense with any of these provisions, nor to change or modify them.”).
243. 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008).
244. Id. at 753. John R. Sand & Gravel concerned a takings claim brought against
the government under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006). Id. After conceding
the claim was timely, the government ultimately won on the merits in the Court of
Federal Claims. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
considered the six-year statute of limitations provided by the statute as jurisdictional
and raised the issue on its own. Id. The Federal Circuit determined the claim was
untimely and dismissed the case without reaching the merits. Id.; John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
245. John R. Sand & Gravel, 128 S. Ct. at 753–54 (emphasis added).
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246

Indeed, section 16 of the
the Vaccine Court as an initial matter.
Vaccine Act declares in part that “no petition may be filed for
compensation under the Program . . . after the expiration of thirty-six
months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or
manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such
247
This language makes section 16 a jurisdictional
injury . . . .”
provision because it goes to the “achieve[ment] [of] a broader
system-related goal” Justice Breyer described in John R. Sand &
248
Indeed, one of the main reasons for establishing the
Gravel.
Vaccine Act was to limit the liability of vaccine manufacturers in civil
court, and having a clear limitations period on lawsuits helps achieve
249
Furthermore, because section 16 provides clear time
that goal.
limits, it is a clear congressional statement on limiting vaccine-related
tort actions and therefore passes the bright-line test articulated by
250
As such, because section 16 is a
Justice Ginsberg in Arbaugh.
jurisdictional provision, it will present a dilemma for the Vaccine
Court faced with the unusual situation of the hypothetical plaintiffs
who try to re-enter Vaccine Court after withdrawing from the OAP
but are dismissed from federal or state court.
As discussed above, the Vaccine Court will have two options when
confronted with the situation of the hypothetical plaintiffs. On one
hand, the Vaccine Court may rely on the earlier decision in Stewart
and find that the original short-form petition is sufficient to count as
251
a petition. If this is the case, then the Vaccine Court may actually
be forced to dismiss this claim because section 11(b)(2) of the
Vaccine Act is clear that “[o]nly one petition may be filed with
246. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (“The
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter . . . is ‘inflexible
and without exception.’”) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
382 (1884)).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2006).
248. John R. Sand & Gravel, 128 S. Ct. at 753.
249. See id. (listing facilitation of the administration of claims, limiting the scope
of waivers of sovereign immunity, and promoting judicial efficiency as examples of
things that achieve a broader system related goal).
250. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (observing that
when the legislature clearly states a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and treat the
provision as jurisdictional). Indeed, Congress clearly sought to limit the liability of
vaccine manufacturers and set up an easy to administer system by passing the
Vaccine Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6348 (“Just as important, the Committee believes that once this system is in
place and manufacturers have a better sense of their potential litigation obligations,
a more stable childhood vaccine market will evolve.”).
251. See generally Stewart ex rel., Stewart v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., No. 02819V, 2002 WL 31965743, (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2002) (concluding short-form petitions
are permissible under the Vaccine Act).
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252

On the other hand,
respect to each administration of a vaccine.”
even if the plaintiffs’ claim references a different vaccine, or the
Vaccine Court decides the filing of the original short-form petition
253
was not technically the filing of a petition, the plaintiffs’ second
claim may still be dismissed because that claim is likely time-barred
254
Although the outcome
under section 16 of the Vaccine Act.
appears harsh, the Vaccine Court does not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate time-barred claims, and is also without legal authority to
255
waive or toll the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations.
Indeed, because section 16 is a jurisdictional component of the
256
Vaccine Act, the Vaccine Court must consider whether the second
Vaccine Act petition is timely in order to ensure it has proper
257
jurisdiction over the claim.
This inquiry will be guided by the
nature of the Vaccine Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity, meaning
its terms must be construed strictly with any ambiguities resolved in
258
favor of the sovereign. Returning to the facts in the hypothetical, it
252. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(2); see also Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., No. 02-819V, 2003 WL 22300298, at *13–14 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3, 2003)
(remarking how Congress hoped many claimants would be satisfied with their “day in
court” and be dissuaded from filing tort suits); Gorski v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., No. 97-156V, 1997 WL 739497, at *3 n.6 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 13, 1997) (stating that
section 11(b)(2) “forbids the filing of more than one petition with respect to a single
vaccination”).
253. In order to reach the conclusion that a short-form petition is not a petition,
the Vaccine Court would need to disagree with the decision in Stewart. See supra Parts
III.A.–B (discussing Stewart, 2002 WL 31965743, and arguing that a short-form
petition is insufficient to qualify as a regular petition).
254. See supra note 231 (showing why the hypothetical claim is now time-barred in
Vaccine Court).
255. See Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that the Vaccine Act’s statute of limitations is a condition on the
waiver of sovereign immunity because the United States and “courts should be
‘careful not to interpret a waiver in a manner that would extend the waiver beyond
that which Congress intended’”) (quoting Stone Container Corp. v. United States,
229 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
256. See supra notes 246–250 (discussing the jurisdictional requirement for
asserting a claim under the Vaccine Act).
257. Indeed, in Kay v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 80 Fed. Cl. 601, 604
(2008), the Court of Federal Claims declared that “John R. Sand & Gravel reinforces
the conclusion reached by the Federal Circuit as to the scope of the Vaccine Act . . .
that the statute of limitations set forth in a congressional wavier of sovereign
immunity establishes a limitation on the Court of Federal Claims’ exercise of
jurisdiction.”
258. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (observing that strict construction
of waivers of sovereign immunity is “firmly grounded in our precedents”); United
States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (declaring that a statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity must be construed strictly and narrowly in favor of the
government); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (noting the terms
of the United States waiver of sovereign immunity, including any statute of
limitations, define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction); see also Stone Container
Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A statute of limitations
is a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. Although
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appears fairly clear the second claim is untimely. For instance, the
259
short-form petition there was filed September 1, 2002. Thus, even
assuming all the symptoms and manifestations of the injury occurred
that same day, according to section 16(a)(2) of the Act, any other
“petition” must be filed before “the expiration of 36 months after the
date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of
260
onset” of the injury, or September 1, 2005.
In the hypothetical,
however, the plaintiff is not looking to return to Vaccine Court until
late 2008 at the absolute earliest, well beyond the thirty-six month
261
Furthermore, the Vaccine
limitations period provided by the Act.
262
263
Court is not permitted to waive or toll the statute of limitations.
Finally, the government would not be estopped from raising claims
questioning the Vaccine Court’s jurisdiction under section 16 of the
264
Vaccine Act because claims of estoppel may not be asserted by a
claimant who is seeking the payment of money against the
265
government.
To conclude, the plaintiffs’ situation upon returning to Vaccine
Court does not look promising. Assuming a federal district court

courts ‘should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly restrictively, they must be
careful not to interpret it in a manner that would extend the waiver beyond that which Congress
intended.’”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
259. See supra note 175 (explaining that a surge of short-form petitions and cases
were filed in the summer of 2002 after the issuance of Autism General Order #1).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2006); see Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States,
893 F.2d 324, 327 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[W]here the court has no jurisdiction, it has no
power to do anything but strike the case from its docket . . . .”); see also Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (stating that jurisdiction must
be established in every case before it can be heard and adjudicated).
261. See supra note 182 (discussing how some plaintiffs in Vaccine Court have
waited close to a decade before having their claim heard).
262. E.g., Jones v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 78 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (2007)
(affirming special master’s decision dismissing case holding he lacked authority to
waive the statute of limitations).
263. See Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 240 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that equitable tolling is not allowed in Vaccine Act claims).
264. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a judicial remedy by which a party may
be precluded from asserting a right to which he otherwise would have been entitled,
if that party’s act or omission has induced another to act to his detriment. Henry v.
United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 795, 799 (1988); see Webb v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs.,
No. 91-373V, 1992 WL 19309, at *7 (Cl. Ct. Jan. 17, 1992) (denying plaintiff from
estopping government from asserting a statute of limitations defense).
265. See Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990) (“From
our earliest cases, we have recognized that equitable estoppel will not lie against the
Government as it lies against private litigants.”); Lamb v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 255, 258 (1991) (affirming special master’s decision the government
was not estopped from asserting a bar to petitioner’s claim even when the petitioner
relied on incorrect legal advice).
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the
judge determines short-form petitions are not petitions,
plaintiffs will be sent back to Vaccine Court facing a strong likelihood
of dismissal there as well. The dilemma for the Vaccine Court will be
whether or not a “petition” was originally filed in Vaccine Court. If
so, then the plaintiffs may be barred because of the one petition rule
set out in section 11(b)(2) of the Vaccine Act. However, if no
petition was filed, or a different allegation is made, the plaintiffs may
still be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Although these
options travel down different legal paths, the end point is the same—
a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim.
IV. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
The illustration above is meant to provide an overview of some of
the overlooked consequences that may befall certain petitioners who
opt out of the OAP to file a civil action in state or federal court. Of
course, the harsh scenario depicted could be avoided at several
points along the way. For one, the plaintiffs could file a traditional
petition accompanied by medical records and other supporting
documentation in Vaccine Court in the first place and have the
Special Master make a decision on the claim under section 12 of the
267
In addition, the plaintiffs could name a thimerosal
Vaccine Act.
manufacturer, and not a vaccine manufacturer, as a defendant in the
civil action and thereby bypass the restrictions of section 11(a) of
Vaccine Act which only prohibits civil actions against vaccine
268
manufacturers. Further, the plaintiffs could bring a claim in state or
federal court alleging a legal theory not covered by the Vaccine Act,

266. See supra Part III.A (explaining that the limited information provided in
short-form petitions may provide a basis for courts to rule that short-form petitions
are not petitions).
267. Assuming the claim was timely filed, this would meet all the requirements of
section 11 of the Vaccine Act and therefore, assuming the plaintiffs reject the
judgment under section 21(a), they could proceed with a civil action. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-11(a), 21(a).
268. Indeed, section 11(a) of the Vaccine Act mentions only “vaccine []
manufacturers” and says nothing about thimerosal manufacturers. Id. § 300aa11(a)(2)(A). Several federal courts have held that thimerosal manufacturers are not
vaccine manufacturers and are therefore not entitled to the protections afforded by
the Vaccine Act. See, e.g., Moss v. Merck & Co., 381 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2004)
(allowing lawsuit against thimerosal manufacturer to proceed); see also Beverly Jones
Sill, Note, Toussaint v. Merck & Co.: Opening the Door to Thimerosal Vaccine Litigation
in Civil Court?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 773, 773 (2005) (remarking that a decision
allowing parents to proceed with a claim against a thimerosal manufacturer may
represent a “crack in the armor that has shielded thimerosal’s manufacturers from
civil court claims made on behalf of thousands of children”).
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269

such as loss of consortium or fraud. And finally, once the test cases
are decided, it is possible Congress may step in and amend the
Vaccine Act in some fashion to avoid any unduly harsh outcome to
270
petitioners.
Still, in light of the fact that a program designed for speed and
efficiency may close nearly all legal doors to people it was specifically
designed to help it is necessary to consider some amendments to the
Vaccine Act to ensure this situation does not occur in the future. The
discussion below briefly considers three different amendments that
would help the Vaccine Act run more smoothly and avoid the
problems identified in this Comment.
A. Attach a “No Omnibus” Provision to Section 12 of the Vaccine Act
Although it initially seemed practical, the conduct of the OAP
deviated far from the original schedule and presents a variety of
271
unintended consequences. After all the time spent sorting through
various motions and discovery, the Vaccine Court ended up where it
arguably should have been in the first place—adjudicating claims on
a case-by-case basis and using those standards to help judge the
272
remaining ones. However, given the lengthy time span of the OAP,
it is possible some claimants will wait for perhaps a decade before the
273
Vaccine Court actually hears their individual claims. Moreover, the
OAP is not the first time the Vaccine Court decided to conduct an
omnibus style proceeding. Indeed, in 1992–93 the court undertook
269. See Ferguson ex rel. Ferguson v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762
(E.D. Ky. 2006) (allowing plaintiffs’ state fraud claim against vaccine manufacturer to
proceed); Maurice v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 04-3105, 2005 WL 3542902, at *6 (E.D. La.
Nov. 7, 2005) (“[T]his Court noted in its Order and Reasons of November 5, 2002,
Congress could have swept loss of consortium claims and lost wages claims within the
purview of the Act, but it did not do so.”); Owens ex rel. Schafer v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 203 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting the Vaccine Act does not
cover claims for loss of consortium).
270. See Helia Garrio Hull, Induced Autism: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Inoculating Vaccine Manufacturers From Liability, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 42 n.329 (2005)
(describing congressional action to try and extend the Vaccine Act statute of
limitations provision from three to six years).
271. See Ruling Concerning Issue of Time for Filing Expert Reports, supra note
177, at 3 (“The actual course of the [OAP], quite obviously, has deviated from [the] initial
schedule . . . . [T]he discovery process has taken much longer than initially
anticipated.”) (emphasis added).
272. See Response to “PSC Update Re Test Case Designations” and Respondent’s
“Motion for Appropriate Relief” at 1–2, Omnibus Autism Proceeding, Autism Master File
(Fed. Cl. Apr. 27, 2007) available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/autism/42707%20motion%20for%20app%20relief.pdf (arguing the
decision to split the OAP into separate test cases calls into question the utility of
further omnibus processing).
273. For instance, the Cedillos filed their vaccine claim in 1998. Mauro, supra
note 2.
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an inquiry into whether the rubella vaccine was causally related to the
274
This
development of persistent joint pain and related symptoms.
275
rubella omnibus proceeding lasted “well into 2001” and lingering
issues stemming from that proceeding were being decided as recently
276
as February, 2008.
The best way to ensure this does not happen again is to amend
section 12(d) of the Vaccine Act, the section that provides for the
powers of the special masters, to include a provision that declares
“special masters do not have the power to conduct omnibus
proceedings.” This will be beneficial because it will force the special
277
masters to adjudicate claims in a case-by-case fashion, avoid the
278
time-consuming issues such as the extent of third party discovery,
and render moot decisions such as whether to issue “Orders
Concluding Proceedings” as opposed to “Decisions” on a claim and
279
However, after the
whether to provide for interim attorneys’ fees.
modification the special masters would still retain flexibility and
280
discretion when conducting proceedings on a single case.
Given
the delays encountered in the OAP, the likelihood of the
adjudication of individual claims extending far into the future, and
the original purpose of the Vaccine Act, a “no omnibus” provision
would be helpful.

274. See O’Connell v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 63 Fed. Cl. 49, 55 (2004)
(recounting the history of the rubella omnibus general causation inquiry in 1992–93
and noting that “[t]he ‘rubella arthropathy omnibus’ proceeding lasted well into
2001”).
275. Id.
276. Zatuchni v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 516 F.3d 1312, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2008). This was a rubella case filed in 1994, but was still in litigation concerning the
appropriate amount of damages in 2008. See id. at 1314–15 (discussing procedural
history).
277. See Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-819V,
2002 WL 31965743, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2002) (“I conclude that the statute,
viewed as a whole, affords the special master with broad discretion to determine when a
petitioner must file the required documents.”); Ruling Concerning Issue of Time for
Filing Expert Reports, supra note 177, at 7 (“I conclude as a matter of law . . . that I
have discretion to allow such petitioners to keep their petitions pending . . . as long as
is appropriate under all the circumstances of each case.”).
278. See Ruling Concerning Motion for Discovery from Merck Re MMR Vaccine at
supra note 24, at 9, 2004 WL 1660351, at *7 (“There is extremely little case law
relating to discovery questions during the 15-year history of the Vaccine Act.”).
279. See Iannuzzi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 78 Fed. Cl. 1, 1 (2007)
(reversing special master decision to award attorneys fees for work related to the
general causation inquiry in the OAP).
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B) (stating the special master’s authority
comes from conducting proceedings “on a petition”) (emphasis added).
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B. Amend Section 11 of the Act to Prohibit the Use of Short-Form Petitions
In light of the problems that may result from utilizing short-form
petitions, it makes sense to modify section 11(c) of the Vaccine Act to
reach a compromise between the ideal situation—where all medical
records are filed initially—and the reality that many claims come in
281
with few records, if any at all. The best middle-ground, therefore, is
to amend section 11(c) to prohibit short-form petitions and also
require some threshold amount of medical records sufficient to
enable the Vaccine Court to determine it has jurisdiction over the
282
claims and for the government to fulfill its role in evaluating claims.
The minimum amount of records needed by the Vaccine Court to
assess whether it has jurisdiction over a claim are: (1) a vaccination
record showing the vaccine received and the country in which it was
283
received; (2) all relevant medical records documenting the onset or
284
significant aggravation of the alleged injury; and (3) an affidavit by
285
a parent or other guardian to attest to the claim. These categories
of records are sufficient for the Vaccine Court to ensure it has
jurisdiction over the claim and also sufficient for the government to
conduct a meaningful review of the petition to see whether it
286
The
warrants compensation under the terms of the Act.
amendment would also simplify section 11(c) by making a blanket
referral to “relevant medical records,” thereby placing the burden on

281. See Stewart, 2002 WL 31965743, at *4 (“[I]n a substantial number of cases . . .
petitions have been filed without any [medical] records at all . . . .”); Discussion of
Issue of “Short-Form” Petitions, supra note 146, at 2 (noting that “[i]n a great many
Program cases . . . petitions have been filed with some medical records”). Having a
claim filed without any medical records is problematic in light of the Supreme Court
decisions regarding statute of limitations and the nature of the Vaccine Act as a
waiver of sovereign immunity. See supra Part III.D (discussing how the Vaccine Act’s
statute of limitations cannot be equitably tolled and as a waiver of sovereign
immunity, the Vaccine Act will be strictly construed). It seems that if the only
document a court has is a single piece of paper, that piece of paper is not sufficient
for the court to conclude it has jurisdiction to proceed with the claim. See supra Part
III.A (questioning the holding in Stewart, 2002 WL 31965743).
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a), (c) for the provisions regarding the Vaccine Act
jurisdiction and documents required in a petition for compensation.
283. Indeed, the Vaccine Court only has jurisdiction over those claims alleging an
injury from a vaccine covered by the Vaccine Injury Table and also those vaccines
that were administered in the United States or in its trust territories. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-11(c)(1)(A).
284. See id. § 300aa-11(c) (listing the documents that shall accompany a petition).
285. See id. § 300aa-11(c)(1) (describing the affidavit required).
286. These items are just a simplified version of what is already required in section
11(c) of the Vaccine Act. Id. Moreover, requiring that relevant medical records be
filed would enable the Vaccine Court to evaluate any statute of limitations issues. Id.
§ 300aa-16.
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the special master and the government to determine whether
287
additional records are needed.
C. Increase The Number of Special Masters
One of the rationales for conducting the OAP was to avoid
288
overwhelming the Vaccine Court with an influx of claims.
This
concern is not without merit because section 12(c) of the Vaccine Act
allows for a maximum of only eight special masters in the Court of
289
Federal Claims. However, now that the OAP is nearing the end of
the general causation inquiry, and given what is likely to happen in
the aftermath via appeals and processing individual claims, it seems
the Vaccine Court and its eight special masters may be ill-equipped to
290
process the remaining 4900 autism claims in a timely fashion. This
time concern is underscored by information from a federal
government survey, which found the average time it takes to decide
291
non-autism vaccine claims is already well over 800 days.
Amending the statute to increase the maximum number of special
masters from eight to twelve would be beneficial in a number of
respects. For one, it would surely help the Vaccine Court adjudicate
292
the bulk of the remaining autism claims in a timely and fair fashion.
Moreover, having additional special masters would likely reduce the
overall time it takes to process a claim, thereby bringing the Vaccine
Act more in line with the 240/420 day time period envisioned by
section 12(g), and reducing the average case processing time in other

287. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906,
2235 (calling upon the government and the special masters to rededicate themselves
to providing an expeditious, non-adversarial, and fair system in overseeing the
Vaccine Act).
288. See supra note 117 (explaining the administrative burden on the Vaccine
Court was one reason for conducting the OAP).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1).
290. See Autism General Order #1, supra note 7, at 1, 2002 WL 31696785, at *1
(“Processing such a large number of cases will stretch thinly the resources of both
the court and the bar.”).
291. For instance, a federal government evaluation considered the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program to be performing at an “adequate” level. See Program
Assessment, Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/expectmore/summary/10003807.2005.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (stating
that the program has made short term progress but still contains design-related
problems). This evaluation also indicated the average time it takes to process vaccine
claims, from filing to payment of damages, over the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 were
894 days, 834 days, and 1,337 days, respectively. Id.
292. Indeed, given the amount of medical records probably involved in each
petition, it could take a special master fair amount of time to reach a conclusion on
the merits of the claim. For instance, in the Cedillo test case there were over 200,000
pages filed. See supra note 19 (describing the extensive testimony of eighteen expert
witnesses involved in the Cedillo case).
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293

cases. And finally, having many special masters issuing decisions in
a timely manner would increase the credibility of the Vaccine Court
and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The debate over vaccines and autism, whether in the context of
legal appeals, scientific and medical research, or media commentary
is sure to go on long after Cedillo. Despite the flaws and delays, the
OAP was a noble attempt by the Vaccine Court to balance the needs
of thousands of petitioners with the policy of ensuring limited liability
for vaccine manufacturers. Some of the long-term procedural
consequences of the OAP, however, and the effects they may have on
certain petitioners have been largely overlooked. Most notably, the
decision by the Vaccine Court to utilize short-form petitions could
result in a host of problems for petitioners who exit the OAP and
attempt to proceed with a civil action in state or federal court. As this
Comment has illustrated, filing a short-form petition in Vaccine
Court could result in the procedural anomaly where a plaintiff who
opts out of the OAP is subsequently barred from state court because
of unmet Vaccine Act requirements and perhaps even barred from
returning to the Vaccine Court because of provisions within the
Vaccine Act. While there are ways to avoid this harsh result, that it
could happen at all demonstrates one problem with conducting a
grand omnibus style proceeding in a federal program of limited
jurisdiction designed to adjudicate claims quickly and on a case-bycase basis. The recommendations proposed, such as eliminating
short-form petitions and increasing the amount of special masters,
would address the problems that may linger in the aftermath of the
OAP and bring the Vaccine Act back towards its original purpose—
offering a fair and streamlined alternative to civil tort litigation.

293. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(g).

